




- -.§u:pumt QJomt cf tlrt ~th .§taus 
'JlTMlfmgLm. [8 . Q}. 20ffe)l,2 
CHAMBERS OF 
JU STICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST ')J-A_ 
Dece mber 9, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No . 76-811 - Regents of University of California 
v. Bakke 
It occurred to me upon returning to Chambers after our 
discussion that our discussi~ n .2L,Yacating the injunctiqn of 
the Superior court in part, etcetera, while quite proper in 
the context of a case coming to us from the federal courts, 
might be unwarranted in a case coming to us from the Supreme 
Court of California. ·while we could undoubtedly affirm in 
part and reverse in part, as I recall the statement of Mr. 
Justice Brandeis quoted somewhere or other, a remand to a 
state court can only be "for furthe r proceedings not incon-
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December 12, 1977 
Re: 76-811 - Regents v. Bakke 
Dear Bill: 
After reflecting on your comments at Conference, 
I have concluded that the trial court's de cree does 
not force us to consider the le gality of a Harvard- s tyle 
program prematurely. A brief procedural history of the 
case shows why. Judge Manker concluded that the s pecial 
admissions prog r am wa s ille gal, but that Bakke would not 
have bee n a dmitte d in 1973 or 1974 even if the program 
had not existed. Pe t. App. 116-117a. Accordingly, the 
judge deni e d an i11junction orde ring Bak ke's applica tio n 
without regard to Bakke's race or t he race of any othe r 
applicant. I d. On appeal, the Cali f ornia Supreme Court 
reversed b e cau se t he trial judge i ncorre ctly p lac e d on 
Bakke the burd e n of s ho wing that he would h ave been 
admitte d in t h e a bsence of di s c r i mina tion. Pet. App . 38a . 
The Unive r s ity con c eded "that it c annot me et the b urden 
of proving that the spe cial admission program did not 
r esult in Bakke 's exclusion." Pet. App . 80a. According l y , 
the Cali f ornia Supr e me Court dire c ted the tri a l cou r t t o 
enter judgment ordering Bakke's admission. Id. Its 
mandate was stayed by this Court. 
If we 2.ffirrn the Supreme Court's order on a narrow 
ground, it will superse de (or at l e ast make moot) the 
relief grante d in the trial court: Ba kke will neve r f ile 
an application, and the injuncti on will be meaningle ss. 
Bakke's is not a clas s action, a nd t he "color-blind" re lief 
applied only to Bakke's app lication: 
"2. [P)laintiff is e ntitl e d to have his applica tion 
for admission to the me dical school considered without 
regard to his race or the race of any other applicant; 
. ., ........... . _,.__~,.i-· 





and defendants a re here by r e stra ine d and e n-
joined from conside ring pl a intiff's r a ce or 
the r a ce of a ny othe r applicant in passing upon 
his application for a dmission." Pet. App. 120a. 
By straining mi ghtily, one could find an ambiguity 
in this injunction. The final "his" could a rguably app l y 
to "any othe r a pplica nt," but the consistent use t hrou ghout 
the paragraph of the p r onoun to refer to Bakke milita t e s 
against such a r e ading, a s does the failure of the trial 
court to sugge st that it was issuing relief to applicants 
who were not parti e s to the suit. 
Respectfully, 
JI 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
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Dec ember 12, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-811 - Regents of The University of California v. 
Bakke 
Contrary to John's memorandum, I am inclined to think 
that in passing on the injunction ordering Bakke's admission 
to the Medical School, we must decide whether the Reents of 
the University of California ma em o race in anv wav as a 
factor in making admissions decisions. 
The judgment of the trial court includes the follow-
ing provision :-- ~- -
"2. That plaintiff is entitled to have his 
application for admission to the medical school 
considered without regard to his race or the 
race of any other, app'licant, and defendants are 
hereby restrained and enjoined from considering 
plaintiff's race or the race of__fillY_other 
a~~ in passing upon- nls"applicat ion"for 
• II a is s ion; . . . 
Petn. App. 120a. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California left this p ortion 
of the j ud~ nt standing. It viewed the certtra r 1 ssue in~ 
t ne ca se a s'e1:n'g°'Fwhether the rejection of better qua lified 
applicants on racial grounds is constitutional," Petn. App. 
\
16a ,. and answered the question in the negative--"no appli-
cant may be rejected because of his race, in favor of 
another who is less qualified, as measured by standar ds ' 
E
p~ l ~~t~ re g-:i-rd ~o r ~ ce." ~etn: App. 25a. '::rt'itis the . 
niversit was ! oroicic:ten 1 rom consider the race of n a li-
~ t to e e aeterrnina tive or in passing ufon Ba es ap-
plication. The breadth of the California courts rulings mak e s 
Jin_ -(/4;, ~ .J)4,,, ~ ~ d:-t -d,/ 
~ tJ,k;, io ~ 
~ 
.. . - "' . 
-2-- it necessary for the Court to consider the constitutional 
propriety of racial preferences in order to determine 
whether Bakke was entitled to an order directing his ad-
mission. A decision limited to a holding that the Medical 
N ) 
School's special admissions program was unconstitutional 
f would not resolve the question of Bakke's admission. The 





administered is unconstitutional, the University is entitled 
to an opportunity to demonstrate that Bakke would have been L ~lb 
denied admission even in the absence of the defect which r fV, 
rendered the program unconstitutional. See Mt. Health~ CitS 
School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 428 U.S. 85-2 7 
(1977). 
It is true that the Supreme Court of California ini-
tially remanded the case to give the University an opportunity 
to make such a showing, Petn. App. 38a-39a, and the University 
conceded that it could not establish that, ~ t for the 
I existence of the special admissions progr am, Bakke would not have been admitted. Petn. App. 80a. In light of the Super-ior Court's judgment and the Supreme Court's opinion, however, 
the University must have understood that it could not grant 
any preference based on race in the course of passing on 
Bakke's application. If in fact the California courts were 
wrong and race does have legitimate uses in making admission 
decisions, the University would be entitled to an opportunity 
under Doyle to establish, upon remand, that Bakke would not 
have been admitted if the special admissions program had been 
administered in a manner conforming to constitutional require-
~
ents. This would place the University in a much more favor-
ble posture, because it might be able to prove that under a 
onstitutionally administered special admissions program 
akke's chances of admission would be remote. Thus the 
uestion of whether Bakke is constitutionally entitled to a 
judgment ordering his admission seems inextricably linked 
to the question of whether special consideration may be 






THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.. 
~upi-tmt <!}cu:rt of t£rt ~tb ~tattg 
~agitmgtcn. ~. <!J. 20.;i'l-, 
December 12, 1977 
RE: 76-811 - Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke 
Dear Bill: 
I had reached essentially the same conclusions on the 
jurisdiction problem as John's memo of December 12 
indicated. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
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CHAMBE:RS 01'" 
JUSTICI:: WM.J . BRENNAN, JR. 
December 13, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-811 - Regents v. Bakke 
\)l,;,A 
I fully agree with Byron's conclusion that in deciding 
whether Bakke was entitled, under the federal 
constitution, to the judgment ordering his admission to 
the Davis medical school we must answer the question 
whether race can ever be a permissible consideration in 
making admissions decisions. After conference, I thought 
that on one view or another the Chief Justice, Byron, 
Thurgood, Lewis, and I believed that it could be 
constitutiondlly pec~issible to give consiJ~ration to r a c~. 
If the Court were to take this position, it would have 
clear consequences for the controversy that is before us. 
As Byron has stated, the University should be afforded an 
opportunity to show that Bakke would not have been 
admitted even if the unconstitutional aspect of the Davis 





is obvious, I should think, that the University's 
concession below should not foreclose it from attempting 
to make that showing upon remand if we take the position 
that race may be given "weight" in the admissions 
process. Both the Superior Court decree and the Supreme 
Court's opinion make plain that the California courts took 
the position that the constitution prohibited Davis from 
ever making an applicant's race a positive factor in an 
admissions decision. Se~ especially Cert Petition at 15a. 
If that view of the law were correct, the Davis Special 
Admissions Program would be invalid in tote: for as 
administered, race apparently was taken into account 1) in 
determining eligibility for the program, 2) in assigning 
the "combined numerical rankings" or "benchmark scores" 
(since these are intended to gauge each applicant's 
potential contribution, see Record at 180-81, and since 
his race is relevant thereto, it seems race may well have 
been given positive weight in making this determination) 
and 3) in giving an absolute preference to the 16 
qualified special program applicants with the highest 
combined numerical rankings. Racial criteria having been 
so employed meant that, under the State Courts' view, the 
only way Davis could demonstrate that Bakke was not 
victimized by unconstitutional discrimination would be by 
showing that ·he would not have been one of the 16 





program been abolished and had the University determined 
admissions under a "colorblind" system. See Cert Petition 
at 37a. 
I understand why Davis believed that it could not 
possibly have made that showing. Of the 35 unsuccessful 
Davis applicants who had benchmark scores in 1973 that 
were the same as or higher than Bakke's (15 were at 469 
and 20, including Bakke, were at 468) 21 were admitted to 
other medical schools. (3 to foreign medical schools) See 
Record at 70. For Davis to demonstrate that Bakke would 
not have been admitted in 1973 under a colorblind system, 
it would have had to prove that of these 35 unsuccessful 
applicants at least 20 both would have been ranked higher 
than Bakke and would have accepted Davis's invitation over 
those of any other school(s) to which they may have been 
admitted. I would think that--especially given that Davis 
had the burden of proof--such a showing would have been 
nigh impossible in the nature of things. Thus, forced 
necessarily to accept the California Courts' 
constitutional view, Davis had virtually no choice but to 
concede that it could not meet the burden of proof imposed 
by the California Supreme Court. 
If, on the other hand, the California Supreme Cour t 
had taken the view that race can constitutionally be made 






be decisive--I doubt the University would have conceded 
that Bakke would have been admitted if the 
unconstitutional aspects of the program had been 
eliminated. Under an interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in which race could be given weight, the only 
clearly objectionable feature of the Davis Special Program 
would have been the "quota" requiring the admission of a 
minimum cf 16 of the qualified task force applicants. The 
use by Davis of a special committee initially to evaluate 
disadvantaged minority applicants would, I assume, be 
justifiable because of the desirability of having a body 
with special expertise perform the delicate task of 
attempting to quantify the potential of such applicants in 
the first instance. If so, even if Bakke would have be en 
admitted under the colorblind system required by the state 
courts, it might have been possible for Davis to show that 
he would not have been admitted if Davis had modified its 
admissions criteria to eliminate the quota and run a 
Harvard type program. Indeed, there is much in the record 
suggesting that, even if the quota had been abolished, 
Bakke would have been rejected. As to 1973--which is the 
only year in which Bakke was close to admission--Lowrie 
stated that the task force admittees had not greatly 
dissimilar median benchmark scores and had the same range 
of benchmark scores as did the regular program admittees. 
See Record at 181. Notwithstanding Archie Cox's 
..... _'Cf; --1'!"'3 
-5-
- disclaimer at oral argument, the record suggests, see 
• 
-
Record at 180-81, and the California courts assumed, see, 
~-, Cert Petition at 2a, that Davis understood that the 
benchmark scores assigned by the two subcommittees were at 
least roughly comparable (i.e. insofar as it is possible 
to compare them, see my memorandum of Nov. 23 at 10-12). 
Certainly then, the record implies that a goodly number of 
the task force applicants might have been admitted even if 
the Regular Committ~e had compared them with the top 
unsuccessful regular program applicants. The committee 
could, consistent with a Harvard type program, have 
preferred slightly "less qualified'' minority 
applicants--i.e. ones with somewhat lower benchmark scores 
--to nonminority applicants like Bakke in order to attain 
the constitutionally permissible goal of integration. In 
short, it is possible that Davis could easily demonstrate 
that Bakke would not have fared any better under a Harvard 
type program than he did under Davis's "quota'' system. 
· In - sura, if- we were to agree that the Davis progr~rn 1s 
unconstitutional but were to conclude that the California 
Supreme Court erred in ruling . that race may never be made 
a positive factor in making an admissions decision, simple 
fairness requires that Davis be given a chance to show 
that Bakke would not have been admitted under a 
constitutional program. Hence, if we believe that race is 






reverse the judgment in part, and remand the case for 
proceedings not inconsistent with our decision. 
An additional reason for reaching the question of the 
permissibility of the use of a racial criteria is the 
California Superior Court's decree, which of course was 
affirmed insofar as it declared the Davis program 
invalid. While I of course respect John's view that the 
use of "his" in the second paragraph of the decree 
suggests that Davis might not be in contempt were it to 
adopt the Harvard program, there is more to the decree. 
The third paragraph, which is the judgment on Davis's 
cross claim for a declaratory judgment that its program is 
a permissible one, declares that the program is invalid. 
I would think it quite possible that a California Court, 
in light of the opinions of the California Superior and 
Supreme Courts in this case, would interpret the second 
and third paragraphs as inextricably linked and declare 
that Davis would be acting illegally were it to adopt the 
Harvard program. 
Of course, my preference rernains--as I voted at 
Conference--to reverse outright. But if that view does 
not carry the day, I think the Court is dutybound to 
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December 14, 1977 
Re: 76-811 - Regents v. Bakke 
Dear Bill: 
Although I have other problems with your most 
recent memorandum, I would first suqgest that the 
validity of your entire analysis rests on an assumption 
that counsel for the University of California were not 
sufficiently competent to understand that the constitu-
tionality of the program ?resented a certworthy issue. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
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Dear Bill: 
December 19, 1977 
Re: 76-811 Bakke v. Regents University of Calif. 
Your memorandum of December 13 does not quite 
reflect my position on the use of race as criteria 
for admission or exclusion. In my memo dated October 21, 
1977 and my conference summary, which I had written 
out in longhand because of the nature of the case, 
indicated my sympathy with leaving maximum "elbow room" 
to educators but stopping short of use of race as such 
to admit or exclude. This led me to an affirmance 
but not, as I thought I made clear at conference, on 
the route Lewis would go. 
As I see the record the University cannot now 
show that it acted in a way which, for me, is foreclosed 
by its position in this case. Hence there is no 
purpose in a remand to explore this. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
~Regards, 
~11 
- CHAMBERS OF" 
~iqrrttttt QJlllttt of tlrt 'Jttttitth ;§taug 
'1a~Jrhtgfott, ~- (4. 2llffe'-1-~ 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
-
-
December 19, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
No. 76-811 Regents v. Bakke 
This memo comments on the recent circulation of 
views as to the scope of our judgment if a majority of the 
Court should agree with the substance of Part IV of my 
memorandum, first · circulated on November 22. My initial 
observation is that the assumption underlying the recent 
circulations is wholly speculative at this time. I 
discern no concensus in favor of my suggested resolution 
of the case -- or indeed of any other resolution. 
But the recent memos from Bill Brennan, Byron, 
and John do serve a useful purpose -- certainly for me. 
As I stated at Conference (when Bi ll Brennan put the 
question as to the form of a judgment under my view), I 
had not considered the scope of the trial court's 
injunction. If it can be read as enjoining Davis from 
ever including race or ethnic origin as one element, to be 
weighed competitively with all other relevant elements in 
making admissions d e cis i ons (i.e., from adopting wh a t I 
shall refer to herein as the "Harvard"-type admissions 
policy), then -- as I stated -- I would certainly favor a 
modification of that injunction. 
In light of the memos recently circulated, and 
some further study, I think the California injunction 
would have to be modified to avoid futu r e uncertainty as 
to its scope. The language is ambiguous, as John and the 
Chief suggest, and it should be clarified. 1/ 
1/ 
- If the injunction had been issued by a 
federal court, I suppose we could simply interpret it to 
resolve the ambiguity. I am not sure we have as much 




Thus, in the unlikely but welcome event that a 
concensus develops for allowing the competitive 
consideration of race as an element, I think we should 
affirm as to the Davis program, but reverse in part as to 
the scope of the injunction. 
2. 
I do not agree, however, that this is a case that 
properly could be remanded for the retroactive application 
by Davis of a Harvard-type admission program that was not 
in existence ir. 1973 or 1974, and that could not possibly 
be structured and applied fairly some four to five years 
after the discriminatory action. Mt. Healthy simply does 
not apply to such a situation. 
In Mt. Healthy there was considerable doubt as to 
whether the First Amendment activity in fact had been the 
"but for" cause of Doyle's discharge. Here, in contrast, 
the University has represented to us that this particular 
racial classification was essential to the admission of 
the minority students in question. The University admits 
acting on that belief and the use of a racial 
classification. In these circunstances Mt. Healthy would 
not support a theoretical reenactment of the Davis 
admissions in 1973/1974, purporting to use criteria not 
used when the applicants were being interviewed and their 
files reviewed. 
The relevant inquiry concerns Davis' interest and 
purpose at the time it excluded Bakke, not the reasons it 
conceivably could have entertained, but did not. 11 
11 
For example, I cannot imagine that a 
remand would have been necessary in Mt. Healthy if the 
school board had fired Doyle only for First Amendment 
activity, and the Board's records so disclosed. Having 
lost on that basis, the board could not have sought a 
remand by contending for the first time that there might 
have been some other reasons that would bave supported the 
firing, even though the board had not in fact considered 
them. In Mt. Healthy, the question was simply whether the 
other reasons that in fact had been considered on the 
record were sufficient. 
If Mt. Hea l thy may be read as permitting those 
guilty of unconstitutional discrimination to defend by 
advancing reasons they might have considered but did not, 
then Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), was overruled sub silentio the 
day it was decided. I say this because such a reading of 
Mt. Healthy would uphold a defendant's decision where 




The answer is not speculative. Davis has conceded its 
two-track system was designed to assure 16 minority 
admissions, and exclude a corresponding number of whites 
regardless of their qualifications and capacity to 
contribute to diversity. In Arlington Heights we said 
that where "there is proof that a discriminatory purpose 
has been a motivating factor in the [state action], 
judicial deference is no longer justified." 429 U.S. at 
265-266. Here the improper racial purpose was the sole 
motivation for the dual admissions program. Mt. Healthy 
is wholly inapposit~. 
3. 
Moreover, the Mt. Healthy-type inquiry is a 
practical impossibility in this case. In Mt. Healt_!!y, 
there was a pre-existing, neutral evaluation procedure and 
a record. It was fair to permit the school board to show 
that on the record -- after deleting the protected conduct 
-- the.pre-existing procedure and standards would have 
produced the same result. Here, the standards and the 
procedural format by which they were applied -- the 
admissions process -- are precisely what is at issue. It 
is sheer speculation to say how -- or even if -- Davis 
would have operated its admission program if it had known 
that the Harvard-type program was permissible and its Task 
Force program was unconstitutional. 
Nor is there a record of legitimate, alternative 
grounds for the decision, as there was in Mt. Healthy. 
Those grounds would have to be derived from the sortof 
case-by-case, individualized comparisons described in my 
memorandum. The time when those comparisons could be made 
has gone forever. Any attempt to make them retroactively 
would be a fictitious recasting of the facts. In 
practical terms, if -- on remand -- Davis reaffirmed the 
admission of all 16 minority applicants in both years and 
adhered to its exclusion of Bakke, it would appear to all 
the world as a self-serving charade. No one would accept 
it as bona fide. 
For these reasons I think it would be improper to 
remand the case under Mt. Healthy. Certainly it would set 
a dangerous and far-reaching precedent. 
Sincerely, 
:~ 
- LFP/lab . 
-
-
C HAMBERS OF 
-
~ttpt'.tUU (!Jltttrl l1f t.Jr.t ~b ~htt.t$' 
-.zur.qittghttt. ~. (!J. 2ll.;t-'!$ 
JUSTIC E JO HN PA U L S TEVENS 
-
-
December 19, 1977 
RE: 76-811 Regents v. Bakke 
Dear Lewis: 
If we construe the injunction as merely prohibiting the 
consideration of the race of any applicant in the processing 
of Bakke's application, he will be admitted to medical school 
and there will be no outstanding injunction forbidding the 
consideration of racial criteria in processing other applications. 
If we explain that this is our understanding of the judgment, 
neither Bakke nor the University can be adversely affected by 
the failure to render an advisory opinion on the validity of 
a Harvard-type program. 
Indeed, the facts (1) that the judgment, fairly read, 
only relates to Bakke's right to be admitted and (2) that 
this reading cannot harm either litigant, are persuasive 
reasons for not reaching out to discuss a profoundly difficult 
constitutional issue that is not necessary to the resolution 
of the controversy between the litigants before us. 
✓I agree completely with your analysis of Mt. Healthy. 
I am working on an additional memorandum relating to the 
statutory question which I hope to circulate in a few days. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
RF , 
JPS-Qruse orActicn 
under Title VI I 
-
-
-::3"' (0$" December 29, 1977 
~ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFEREN~E 
76-811 - Regents of the University of ~a1ifornia v. A11an Bakke 
Although I share the Solicitor Genera~'s ultimate 
conclusion that an individual may maintain a cause of action 
under Title VI, I think a somewhat more careful consineration 
of the problem than is found i n his brief is appropriate. Most 
of the following discussion is devoted to analyzing various 
pieces of Title VI's legislative history that appear to p rovide 
answers to the question whether Congress intendea either to 
deny or to create a private remedy. This rather lengthy 
exegesis of legislative history is in response to what 1 
believe are inaccuracies presented by both sides. For 
instance, I do not think the Solicitor General is correct in 
saying that there is "no contemporaneous legislative h~story 
concerning private actions." (Br. at 32). On the other hann, 
the University exaggerates the significance an0 misstates the 
meaning of much of the legislative evidence on which it 
relies. 
,_ By analyzing . the legislative history i.n netai1., however, 1 
do not mean to suggest that it provides the dispositive answer 
76-811 - 2 -
here. In fact, I think the only conclusion that can be reachen 
- with any confidence is that Congress a i.d not express any - ---- -
-
particular hostility or approval towards prfvate causes of 
,,_,, ... -... ... ----
action. Framing the inqujry in terms of the four-part r.ort v. - -
Ash test, 422 U.S. at 78, this means that the second branch of 
that test is inconclusive in this case. ~he other three 
branches, however, unquestionably point towards-an impliea 
cause of action. There is no serious controversy with respect 
to the first and fourth aspects of that test. In other words, 
assuming that Title VI applies to discrimination against all 
races, Bakke's status as a potential benefic i ary of a feaerally 
funded program definitely brings him wlthin the "class for 
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted." Id. (emphasis 
in original). And it is also clear that a cause of action 
based on race discrimination has not been "traditionally 
relegated to state law." Id 
The thj rd Cort test--whether an implied cause of action is 
consistent with the purposes of the legis 1 ative scheme--also 
overwhelmingly favors an implied pri.vate action. As will be 
shown, Title VI was enacted against a background of indivi.nual. 
litigation seeking to stop the same practices against which 
Title VI was aimed. Congress generally approved of this 
litigation and believed that it woul.d play a useful role i.n 
carrying out Title VI's purposes. And although I have grave 
doubts about attaching too much signif i cance to subsequent 
- legislative history, it is apparent, 
76-811 - 3 -
- see pp. 25-26, infra, that, since enactment of Title VI, 
Congress has consistently viewed private act i ons as a 
complementary aspect of the T j tle's remedial scope. One can 
say, I suppose, that the subsequent i nterpretations of Title VI 
by Congress, like the unanimous rul i ngs of the lower federal 
courts and this Cou-rt's unanimous assumpti.on in Lau v. Ni.chols, 
414 U.S. 563, indicate that the third portion of r,ort test is 
so decisively weighted towards the side of an implied cause of 
action that the i ssue would not have been regaraea as a serious 




In any event, the only real. controversy is over the 
question whether there is any indication of legislative i ntent 
either to create or to deny a private remedy. As indicateo, I 
am inclined to believe that this issue ultimatel_y boil_s aown to 
one's appraisal of sparse evidence which does not clearly point 
in either direction. In this situation, I think the the other 
three Cort factors control and lead to the conclusion that 
there should be an implied cause of action in this case. 




76-811 - 4 -
I 
I. Remedy Necessary to Further Purposes of the Act: 
To date, the federal courts have unanimously ruled, or have 
assumed, that an individual may maintain a cause of action 
under Title VI. See, e.g., Bossier Parish School_ Board v. 
Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th r.ir. 1967), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 
911; Lau v. Nichols, supra. This unanimity reflects the 
general recognition that a private cause of action to enjoin 
discriminatory practices would further the remedial_ purposes of 
Title VI. 
First, there can be no question but that r.ongress, in 
enacting Title VI, intended to protect what it viewed as 
important individuaJ. rights. See, e.g., comments of 
Representative Lindsay, 110 Cong. Rec. 1540: 
"Everything in this proposed legislat i on has to do with 
providing a body of law which will surround and protect the 
individual from some power complex. This bill is designed 
for the protection of individuals. When an individual is 
wronged he can invoke the protection to himself, but if he 
is unable to do so because of economic distress or because 
of fear then the Federal Government is authoriiea to invo~e 
that individual protection for that individual. • " 




An equally strong thread of the legislative history is that 
Congress' dominant purpose was not to cut off funds, hut to end 
discrimination. And the inaividual lawsuit was acknow 1 enged as 
an appropriate means of reaching that end. See, e.g., comments 
of Senator Ribicoff, 110 Cong. Rec. 7067: 
"Personally, I think it would be a rare case \:hen funds 
would actually he cut off. In most cases, al_ternative 
remedies, principally lawsuits to end discrimination would 
be the preferable and more effective remedy. 1f a Negro 
child were kept out of a school receiving f eaeral func'!s, I 
think it would be better to get the Negro chila into school. 
than to cut off funds and impair the ec'!ucati.on of tl-ie white 
children." 
See also, comments of Senator Javits, 1.10 Cong. Rec. 7103: 
Senator Humphrey, id., at 5090. 
Implying a cause of act i on, espec i aJly whe r e the action 
seeks only injunctive relief, thus fits precisel_y within the 
remedial purpose of the Title. Conversely, tl-ie failure to 
imply a cause of action could hinder those remeaial purposes. 
In this case, as in others where the Court has impliea a 
private right of action, the feaeral agencies' ability to 
insure compliance with the overriding goal of the 
statute--expressed here in~ 601--is doubtful without the 
assistance of individual actions. See, ~~ A1_1_en v. State 
Board of Education, 393 u.s. 544, 556. In fact, it coulo we11 
be argued that Congress recognized that its remedial scheme 
deoended on the baJance 
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- between the existence of a broaa, but sel0om exercised 
power--federal fund cutoffs--and the existence of the narrow 
remedies available through individual_ litigation. See comments 
of Senator Ribicoff, 110 Cong. Rec. at 7065: 
-
"We come then to the crux of the dispute--how this right 
[to participate in federalJ .y aided programs without 
discrimination] should be protected. And even thj_s issue 
becomes clear upon the most elementary analysis. If 
Federal funds are to be dispensed on a nonaiscriminatorv 
basis, the only possible remedies must fall into one of two 
categories: First, action to end discrimination; or 
second, action to end the payment of funds. Obviously 
action to end discrimination is prererable since that 
reaches the objective of extending the funds on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. But if the discrimination 
persists and cannot be effectively terminatea, how eise can 
the principle of nondiscrimination be indicated except by 
nonpayment of funds?" 
Further evidence of the role private suits were to play can 
be found in Congress' frequent and approving references to a 
contemporaneous, successful constitutional challenge brought by 
individuals against a segregated hospital receiving Hill-Burton 
funds. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital_, 323 F.2d 
e 959 (CA4 1963), cert. denied, 376 u.s. 938; see,~, r.omments 
of Sen. Humphrey, 110 Cong. Rec. 6543; Sen. Javits, id., at 
12719. These references clearly show that Congress knew that 
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practice rather than cutting off funds, could and would be 
brought against recipients of federal funds--most obvious l y 
under§ 1983. And there is not the sl_ightest indication in the 
legislative history that Congress intended agency action under 
§ 602 to supplant these individual suits~ nor ls there any 
indication that these private actions were considered 
incompatible in any way with the remedies providea ln the 
remainder of the Title. 
-
Of _course, it might be argued that, in enacting Title VT, 
Congress simply recognized the existence of indiviaual suits 
which might parallel agency action under~ 602, but that any 
expansion of the individual's right to sue was consiaerea 
unnecessary. In other words, the remedia l purposes of ~itie VI 
are satisfied if the individual can bring a constitutional 
challenge, presumably under§ 1983, against the p~rticular 
practice, and if that action is not available, then no further 
action fits within the congressional scheme. There are two 
possible responses to this argument. First, it has been 
suggested that there may be a cause of action under~ 1983 
here, even absent a constltutional claim. Section 601 may be 
viewed as a law protecting the sort of "rights, privileges, or 
immunities" covered by§ 1983. See Adickes v. Kress & ro., 3q9 
U.S. 146, 150 n. 5. Under this view, ~ 1983, when read 
- together with§ i343(3), provides a private cause of action for 
individuals claiming to be protected by a statute that provides 
for the "equal rights of citizens." The 
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- legislative history of § 601, however, indicates that it is 
probably unnecessary to rely on this approach towards~ lq83. 
-
-
Section 601 is expressed in broad terms, and :its 
prohibition is not directed solely at state action. Instea~, 
both the main Senate sponsor of the r,i_vil. Rights Act, Senator 
Humphrey, and the spokesman for. T:i t le · VI i tse 1 f, Sena tor 
Pastore, clearly stated, in almost identical words, that the 
prohibition of§ 601 was intended to extend beyond the 
generally accepted limits of S l983. 
"The purpose of Title VI is to make sure that funds of the 
United States are not used to support racial 
discrimination. In many instances the practices of 
segregation or discrimination, which ~itle VI seeks to en~, 
are unconstitutional. This is clearly so wherever Fe~eral. 
funds go to a state agency which engages in racial 
discrimination. It may al.so be so where Federal fun~s go 
to support private, segregated institutions, under the 
decision in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 
F.2d 959 (CA4 1963), certificate denied fsicl, March?, 
1964. In all cases, such discrimination is contrary to 
national policy, and to the moral sense of the Nation. 
Thus, Title VI is simply designed to insure that Federal 
funds are spent in accordance with the ronstitution an~ the 
moral sense of the Nation." ll0 ~ong. Rec. 6544, 7062. 
Or, as expressed by Senator Pastore, the principle of Title 
VI is that "rw]hen one dips one's hands into the Federal 
Treasury, a little democracy clings to whatever is with~rawn." 
110 Cong. Rec. 7063. Based on these and other broad statements 
on the scope and remedial goals of the Title, there would be no 
reason to impose a state action limitation on individual_ 
suits. Nothing in the legislative history suggests that ~ 1qg3 
marks the outer boundaries of possible private causes of action. 
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- Whether or not the Simkins decision was to be followed in other 
circuits, Congress evidenced its view that private causes of 
action would be appropriate against private institut i ons 
receiving federal funding. See, e.g., comments of Senator 
Javits, 110 Cong. Rec. 7102. This same point was made in the 
government's amicus · brief in Lau v. Nichols as fol.Jaws: 
-
"[T]he applicability of Tit l e VI here does not depend upon 
the outcome of the equal protection ana l ysis. Pursuant to 
the power of Congress to 'prov i de r;_n its expendituresl for 
the ••. genera l welfare of the Unjted States' (U.S. 
Constitution, Art. I, § 8, Cl . 1 ), enhanced li.ke alJ_ othe r 
congressional powers by Article I's 'necessary and proper' 
clause, the statute i ndependently proscribes the conduct 
challenged by petitioners and prov i des a aiscrete basis For 
injunctive relief." Brief at 15. 
On the other hand, it is not entirely clear that an 
implied cause of action under Ti tle VI shou l a, in all respects, 
go as far as§ 1983. An argument can be made that the remenial 
purposes of Title VI would be furthered by ~llpwing private 
causes of action to enjo i n discriminatory practices, but not to 
impose damages. Briefly, the argument would _be that Ti tl.e VI 
was not intended to provide compensation for discrim j natory 
practices, but only to end those practices, and the only 
monetary coercion available under the Title would be feaeral 
fund cutoffs, a remedy that a private litigant cannot seek, see 
discussion at p. 27, infra. 
In any event, these issues are not presented in Bakke. 
- Instead, Bakke's suit is clearly the sort of private acti.on 
that Congress envisioned as a complementary aspect of the~ h02 
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concededly receiving substantial feneral funds, and the private 
litigant is seeking only admission to the program, not the 
termination of federal assistance. Congress expressed its 
conclusion that actions such as this could be brought ana that 
these actions would further the remedial purposes of the ~itle. 
II. Legislative Intent: 
Legislative intent has a very narrow meaning ana purpose 
when used to support or counter a request to i..mpl.y a cause of 
action. Although the language in some cases has suggestea that 
the Court will not imply a cause of action without c 1 ear 
evidence of supporting ~egislative intent, see National 
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroaa 
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458: Securities Investor Protectlon 
Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 420-421, that requirement has 
recently been qualified. 11 fI]n situations in which i_t is clear 
that federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, 
it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private 
cause of action, although an explicit purpose to oenv such 
cause of action would be controll.ing. 11 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S., 
at 82 (emphasis in original). That situation exists here. As 
indicated above, the legislative hi.story overwhe1.ming1_y shows 
that Congress wanted to protect the personal right to be free 
from discrimination. Thus, the issue under this port i_on of the 
Cort test is whether Congress evidenced a specific intent to 
deny a private cause of action. 
In my view, this is the only Cort criterion which creates 
any serious doubt over whether a cause of action should be 
76-811 - 11 -
- implied. The University presents essential 1y three arguments 
on legislative intent: (a) it points out that otl-)er 'I'itles of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expli.cjt:iy create a private cause 
of action, but that Title VI does not; (b) it cl.aims that tl-)e 
remedial provisions of§ 602 were intended to be exclusive; 
and (c) it relies on certain specific statements made during 
the congressional debates. 
-
-
A. Comparison of Title VI with Other 'T'itles: 
Titles II, III, IV, and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1Q64 
contain provisions specifically dealing with private causes of 
action. 42 u.s.c. ~Vi 2000a-3 (a); b-2; c-8; ana e-5 (f). 'T'itle 
VI, of course, does not contain such a provision. rrhere are, 
however, several significant difficulties in drawing the 
negative inference that the University suggests from these 
facts. First, this Court has failed to draw such inferences in 
similar situations. For instance, in J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 
U.S. 426, the court imp1_ied a cause of action unc'ler ~ 1.4 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even though~ 1-4--which was 
silent on the issue of private causes of action--was surrounded 
by companion sections explicitly authorizing private actions. 
E.g.,§§ 16(b) and 18(a); see Piper v. Chris-Craft Industri.es, 
430 U.S. 1, 24-25, cf. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 
147. As was stated in Cort v. Ash, th i s sort of "excursion 
into extrapolation of legislative intent ri.s] enti~ely 
unilluminating." 422 U.S., at 83 n. 14. It is unilluminating 
because, contrary to the University's assumption, there i_s more 
than one inference that can be 
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logically and plausibly drawn from the fact that one section of 
- a piece of legislation does not mention private causes of 
action, while others do. Title VI is a case in point. 
-
The private action provisions in the Civil Rights Act are 
of two sorts. First, Titles VII and II estabJish private 
actions that are significantly different in procedure ano./or 
remedy from the type of action that might be i_mpl ierl. 'I'it les 
III and IV, on the other hand, merely state that "rnlothing in 
this subchapter shall affect adversely the r~ght of any person 
to sue" for the discriminatory practices covered by the 
subchapter. 42 u.s.c. ~~ 2000b-2 and c-8. It would be 
plausible to argue that the existence of the first provisions 
"merely reflects an intention to modify the remedies which 
might otherwise be implied, while leaving unqual i fiea. the 
possible liability arising from violation" of Title VI. See 
Note, Implying Civil Remedies, 77 Harv. L. Rey. 285, 290 
(1963). The second provisions give rise to an even more 
interesting inference. The University argues that Titles III 
and IV are ~similar to Title VI in that they create no new 
substantive obligations. Brief, at 20 n. 3. If this is 
correct, and if there is a negative infe~ence to be rlrawn from 
the fact that Title VI does not contain a "savings" clause such 
as 2000b-2 or c-8, then that inference must be that Title Vt 
does "adversely a f feet" the right of ind iv iclua 1.s to sue for 
discrimination in federally funded programs. Yet if anything 
- is clear from the legislative history of Title VI, it is that 
the Title was intended to expand, not restrict, the methods 
available for ending discrimination. Congress' approval. of 
private causes of action challenging discrimination is manifest 
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from the debates, see p. 6, su~L and certainly refutes any 
- claim that the lack of a "savings" clause should be interpreted 
as adversely affecting pre-existing individual rights. It 
would be far more consistent with the legislative history of 
the Title to argue that the absence of a "savings" provision 
indicates that Congress left open the possibility that Title Vt 
would actually further the rights of persons to sue for 
discrimination in federally funded programs. Or perhaps more 
persuasively, it could be argued that Title VI did not require 
a "savings" provision because it does not authorize the 
Attorney General to sue on behalf of the individual. See pp. 
21-22, infra. It is not necessary, however, to establish that 
either of these inferences is more compe 11 i ng than the 
- University's negative inference; it is sufficient that the University's evidence of legislative intent is no more 
compelling than the similar evidence reiected in Cort as 
"unilluminating." 
B. Relationship Between~~ 601 ano 602: 
Focusing on the legislative debates over whether federal 
loans and repayment guarantees were covered by Title VI, the 
University argues that agency action under~ 602 was intended 
to be the exclusive method for enforcing~ 601. It claims that 
the debates reveal that the "sol_e function of~ 601 would be to 
lay a predicate for administrative action under~ 602." Brief, 
e at 19. This claim is suspect for two reasons. First, the 
debates were not even tangentially related to the jssue of 
private causes of action. Second, even if the broad subiect 
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- matter of the debates were viewed as touching the private cause 
of action question, the debates are of little assistance in 




The specific statutory issue involved in these debates was 
whether the language excluding federal loan guarantees from 
Title VI coverage should be placed in~ 601 as weJ1 as~ 602. 
Generally speaking, the proponents of Title VI took the 
position that it was sufficient to place the language in~ 602 
alone, while the opponents wanted the limitation expressea in ~ 
601. During the course of this debate, there were a number of 
comments by Title VI's supporters to the effect that~ 601. 
merely established a broad principle and that the enforcement 
of that principle was limited by§ 602. See, e.g., romments of 
Senator Humphrey, ll0 Cong. Rec. 13378: 
"First of all, § 601 states general po l icy. Section 602 
states the means of effectuating that general policy, the 
implementation and the exclusion. The exclusion rel.ates 
to, as the language says, other than a contract of 
insurance or guaranty. So FDIC--Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporati.on--and all activities pertaining thereto are 
eliminated. The Federal Housing Administration is 
eliminated." 
Even assuming that this viewpoint prevailed in Congress, i.t 
still does not answer the question whether ~ongress inten~ed to 
deny a private cause of action. The University's argument i.s 
that, since Title VI's supporters argued that the scope of the 
Title could be limited by amending only~ 602, that section 
must be viewed as providing the excl.usive form of 
relief--agency action. This use of the debate over~§ 601. and 
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- 602 suggests that the choice before Congress was, on the one 
hand, agency action under~ 602, or, on the other, private 
action under§ 601. If that were true, then comments such as 
Senator Humphrey's wou l d offer strong proof that ~ongress 
intended to preclude the possibility of pr i vate causes of 
action . In fact, that i s not the case, 
-
The issue before Congress was whether~ 60l authorized 
federal agencies to act in areas not covered by~ 602--in 
particular, housing. The President had issued a limited order 
requiring nondiscr i mination in federal housing, and the 
opponents of Title VI feared that§ 601 would be reaa as giving 
executive authority for more expansive orders. See, e.g., 
COITu'llents of Senator Robertson, 110 Cong. Rec. 74 1 9: of Senator 
Long, id., at 13435; and of Senator Gore, id.Lat 13332. By 
placing the "guarantee exception" l anguage i n~ 601, as well as 
§ 602, these Senators wanted to make sure that no "open 
housi ng" orders would be issued in the future, and that the 
existing orders issued by the President would be 
countermanded. See, ~~, Comments of Senator Sparkman, 1_1_0 
Cong. Rec. 7092; 7558; and of Senator Stennis, io., at 70Q2. 
The proponents of Title VI wanted the limiting language p1.acea 
only in§ 602. The surface explanation for this was that they 
wanted to preserve the general principle of~ 601 intact and 
without exceptions. See, e.g., Comments of Senators Pastore 
4t and Keating, 110 Cong. Rec. l3437. The more pract i.ca 1. reason 
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- was that the opponents' amendment to § 601 might negatively 
affect the existing Executive nondiscrimination orders. See, 
e.g., Comments of Senator Gore, 110 Cong. Rec. 13376; Senator 
Humphrey, id., at 13929. 
-
A search through these debates reveals no mention of 
private causes of action. The issue was whether~ 602 was the 
exclusive source of authorization for agency action, not 
whether agency action was the exclusive remedy for ~itle VI 
violations. See,~~ summary of debate at 110 Cong. Rec. 
13930-13931. It would be entirely consistent with the 
structure of Title VI and the aebate over~~ 601 and 602 to 
argue that, while§ 602 establishes lim i ts on agencv action, it 
does not establish that agencies alone may take action to 
effectuate the purposes of§ 601. 
A further difficulty with the Un i_vers i ty 's argument i_s 
simply that the debate on which it relies--even assuming that 
it is substantially related to the private action i_ssue--ended 
without any clear resolution of the question whether~ 60J_ has 
any significance independent of~ 602. As the Senators 
themselves admitted, there was a good deal_ of confusion over 
the combined effect of§~ 601 and 602 on Executive orders i_n 
areas such as housing, and on the relationship between the 
sections in general. See,~, Comments of Senator Humphrey, 
- 110 Cong. Rec. 13436; Senator Ri_bicoff, id.Lat 13332. Even 
towards the end of the debate, supporters as we11 as opponents 
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- of Title VI argued that § 602 did not 1.imit § 601. . See, ~~ 
Comments of Senator Case, 110 Cong. Rec. 13930. The 
controversy was finally resolved when ~ongress <'lecided to add~ 
605 to Title VI. That section provides- that "fnl oth i.ng in thj s 
subchapter shall add to or detract from any existing autho~ity 
with respect to any program or activity uncler which Fe<'lera1 
financial assistance is extended by way of a contract of 
insurance or guarantee." In other words, Congress 
-
-
compromised. The proponents of Title VI did not want to rjsk 
the possibility that an amendment to~ 60l would he read as an 
endorsement of discrimination in housing and thus an overruling 
of existing Executive housing orders; the opponents dia not 
want to risk the possibility that S 601 would be read as 
allowing agency action even beyond that provided for in ~ 602. 
The need for a compromise position and a separate section 
could easily be interpreted as supporting a concl.usion that~ 
601 has independent significance. After all, there wou1_0 be no 
reason to state that "nothing fin Title VIl shall add" to 
existing authority with respect to federal contracts of 
insurance a guarantee, unless~ 601 could be interprete~ as 
providing that additional authority. Regardless of the impact 
of§ 605, however, it is clear that the~ 601/~602 <'lebate does 
not reveal any congressional hostility or aisapproval of 
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C. Specific Statements: 
I have found three statements in the legislative history 
explicitly mentioning that Title VI does not create a private 
cause of action (two of these are referred to by the 
University). They are as follows: 
"Senator Keating: Parentheticall.y, while we favored the 
inclusion of the right to sue on the part of the agency, 
the State, or the facility which was aeprivea of federal 
funds, we also favored the inclusion of a provision 
granting the right to sue to the person suffering from 
discrimination. This was not inciuaen in the bill. 110 
Cong. Rec. 7065. 
"Representative Gill: Nowhere i_n this section do you fina 
a comparable right of legal action for a person who feels 
he has been denied his rights to participate in the 
benefits of federal funds. Nowhere. Only those who have 
been cut off can go to court and present their claim. ll0 
Cong. Rec. 2467. 
"Senator Kuchel: As can be cleari_y seen, Title VI is, in 
reality, a series of restrictions on executive acti_on whi.cli 
I believe could now be taken and ought to be taken. In 
fact, a good case could be made that a remerv is provirer. 
for the State or local official who is practicing 
discrimination, but none is provided for the victim of tlie 
discrimination." 110 Cong. Rec. 6562. 
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- Read alone, each of these statements seems to provide 
-
-
evidence of legislative intent to deny a private action. Read 
in context, however, they appear to be far more ambiguous, or 
simply not directed towards an individual suit to enjoin a 
discriminatory practice. 
For instance, Representative Gill's comments, whic"1 contain 
the most emphatic denial of a privat~ right oF action, appear, 
in context, to be concerned only with lndividual suits to cut 
off federal funds, not with suits to enioin a discriminatorv 
practice. His comments occurred in response to the clalm that, 
after Title VI, the courts would be "cluttered" with indlviaua1 
suits brought to obtain judicial review of an agency's decision 
not to cut off funds, Comments of Representative Poff, 11.0 
Cong. Rec. 2464, and were preceded by the following 
observations: 
"If you will look at Title VI, you will see very clear1y 
that we have here a relatively mild form of cut-off 
provisions. There is no mandatory or arbitrary stopp1ng of 
funds • • 
"It requires that any action taken be 'consistent with 
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing 
the financial assistance.' It states that compliance wi11 
be asked for under two possible routes. One is termination 
and the other is by any other means authorized by law. 
-
-
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"Further, Title VI provides very clearly that the person or 
the agency which is denied the money, if it desires, can go 
to the courts •.. and that court can determine whether or 
not the cut-off is in accord with the law ana whether or 
not it was properly done under this statute. 
"Nowhere in this section do you find a comparable right of 
legal action •.. etc." 110 Cong. Rec. 2466-2467 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, the assurance that the legislation wouia create no 
private cause of action was directly linked to actions to 
terminate federal financial assistance. These assurances must 
be contrasted to the approving references to Simkins v. Moses 
H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (CA4 1963), seep. 6, 
supra. 
Senator Kuchel's comments,~~ also occur {n the context 
of a discussion of when and how federal funds could be cut off 
under the Title, and , in any event, they are far from 
dispositive since he simply states that a "good case" could be 
made for the lack of a private action. Of the three 
statements, Senator Keating's appears to give the University 
its most substantial support. On the face of the statement, 
the Senator merely states the obvious--Title VI contains no 
4I explicit provision for a private cause of action--and, in fact, 
he indicates that he would favor such an action. The 
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- implication of the statement, however, i.s that hi.s 
view--favoring a private cause of action--was reiected ln the 
developing stages of Title VI. To determine whether this 
inference is warranted, some discuss i on of the background of 
Senator Keating's comment i s necessary. 
-
Senator Keating proposed an amendment to ~itle VI (then S. 
1731) on August 9, 1963. It prov i ded iudic i al review of any 
agency decision respecting the cut off of funds for both the 
funded program and the intendea benefic i arv. 1 09 rong. Rec. 
14639-14640. ~he amendment did not provide for a private cause 
of action to enjoin discriminatory practices. Four aays later, 
S~nator Ribicoff proposed an amendment which a1J.owed the 
Attorney General to bring a civi l action to en~o i n federa11y 
funded programs from engaging in discriminatory practices. 1 0Q 
Cong. Rec. 14833-14835. Senators Ri bicoff ano Keating then 
combined their proposals into one proposal which contalned (a) 
judicial review of agency decisions for the benefic i aries as 
well as the recipients of federal funding~ (b) authorlzation 
for the Attorney General to bring civil iniunctive actionsi and 
(c) a provision allowing private causes of action. 1.09 rong. 
Rec. 15375. 
As Senator Keating po i nted out, 110 Cong. Rec. 7065, the 
Administration revised its version of Titl_e V1 shortly after 
- the Keating-Ribicoff Amendment was presented in the Senate. 
That revision, which tracks the current provisions of ~it1e VI 
in most material respects, contained none of the three 
proposals 
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- referred to supra. However, it is extremely c'Hfficult to sav 
that the failure to include a private cause of action provisjon 
reflects in any way a congressional intent to aeny such an 
action. 
-
First, the Attorney General, in commenting on the 
Administrator's revised bill, gave no innication that there was 
any opposition to a private cause of action, see Hearings on S. 
1731 ands. 1750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., before the rommittee 
on the Judiciary, at 333 et seq., nor was such opposition 
voiced at any time during the legislative struggle over the 
Civil Rights Act. Instead, the legislative historv suggests 
that the Attorney General's opposition to the Keating-Ribicoff 
proposal was based on that off i ce's unwillingness to assume 
responsibility for a broad range of civil litigation. ~he 
Title VI Amendment was part of a broaner. amend_ment to Part TII 
of the Civil Rights Act of J957 which woula have aut'1orizec'l the 
Attorney General to institute an injunctive suit in a civil 
rights case where an individual's Fourteenth or First Amendment 
rights were being violated. See Comments of Senator ,Javits, 
109 Cong. Rec. 14921. According to Senator Keating, the 
Attorney General only wanted the power to bring civil 
injunctive suits with respect to the publ. ic accommoc'lations and 
public education provisions of the Civil Rights Act. See 109 
Cong. Rec. 19739-19743. If this is the reason why the 
- Administration did not incorporate the Keating-Ribicoff 
proposal into its bill, it would have l_ittle bearing on whether 
or not the Administration favored a private cause of action 
under the Title. 
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- More importantly, although the Administration bil.1 cHa not 
-
contain a specific private cause of action provision, it did 
substantially rewrite the language of~ 601. The Solicitor 
General's brief argues that, if~ 601 had not been intended to 
create enforceable personal rights, the section wouin have 
read: "No program discriminating on account of race shal 1. 
receive federal funds." (Brief at 28). Yet this is 
essentially how§ 601 read as introduced into the Senate, see 
Hearings, supra, at 11, 20, and as repronuced in the 
Keating-Ribicoff proposal, 110 Cong. Rec. 15375 (" •.. no such 
assistance shall be furnished un 1 ess in the administration of 
the program or activity, no discrimination is practicea .• 
"). The Administration proposal, for the first time, 
introduced the language "rn]o person .•. sha11 ••• be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance." In light of this very 
substantial change, which expressed the prohibition of ~ 601 in 
terms of a personal right, it seems unlikely that the 
Administration intended to foreclose the possibility of privc1te 
actions to enjoin discriminatory practices. 
Finally, it should be noted that Senator Keating's 
statement, supra, may be read, like the others, as ref:erring 
only to private actions to review agency decisions on fund 
cut-offs. On its face, such an interpretation is reasonable, 
- since the preceding clause in his statement refers to review of 
fund cut-offs. That interpretation 5s al.so substantiallv 
supported by the legislative background of his proposal, 
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outlined above. As indicated, Senator Keating's initial 
- concern was to provide for ind iv idua 1. review of agency 
decisions to cut off funds, seep. 21, supra, ana his statement 
before the Judiciary Committee on the Aclmini.stration bill 
reflects the same concern: 
-
"There is only one respect in which • • . there is anv 
material departure from the amendment offeren bv Senator 
Rib icof f and myself. • • • 't'ha t i.s, t°f1ere is no prov is i.on 
in this amendment for enforcement proceeaings bv the 
victims of unremedi.ed discrimination .••• Tf the states 
can obtain iudicial review where funds are unfairly 
withheld, as the Attorney General proposes in this 
amendment, the victims of discrimination, it seems to me, 
should have access to the courts where the funcls are 
unfairly granted. Thi.s seems to me only elemental fairness 
and it should be the right of judicial review to both 
parties that was includea in our amendment." Hearings, 
supra, at 335. 
Examination of the background of Senator Keating's 
statement thus reveals two points: First, given the Senator's 
primary concern with judicial review of agency decision to 
cut-off funds, it is not at all clear that his statement was 
meant to encompass private causes of action to enioin 
discriminatory practices. Second, even if the statement noes 
encompass such a private action, it does not follow that it is 
an expression of congressional intent to nenv a private 
action. As indicated, the concern with the Keating-Ribicoff 
amendment appears to have been far removed fr.om t°f1e private 
action issue. The importance of the Keating-Ribicoff 
amendment, therefore, seems very similar to that of the 
"Meador" amendment, which the University concedes is not 
helpful to its position (see Brief at 21 n 5). Both mention 
- private causes of action, and both were reiected, but nei.ther 
were clearly rejected on grounds that reflected congressional. 
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D. Other Evidence of Legislative Intent 
The Solicitor General points out that post-en~ctment 
legislative history supports the conclusion that Title VI 
creates a private cause of action. Congress has twice amen~e~ 
Title VI since the Fifth Circuit deciaea that there was a 
private cause of action under the Title, Bossier Parish School 
Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (1967), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 
911, but at neither time has it indicated disapproval of the 
Bossier ruling. See 84 Stat. 121 (adding~ 2000d-6) ~ ana 81 
Stat. 787 (amending ~ 2000d-5) • More s i.gn if icant 1.v, in SP.Vera 1 
recent enactments, Congress has assumed that Titl.e VI creates a 
private cause of action. The SoJ.icitor Genera 1 's brief 
mentions two of these enactments--the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 (Brief at 33 n. 30), 29 u.s.c. § 7q4, and the 1q76 rivil 
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 u.s.r,. ~ 1988 (Brief at 
32). The Rehabilitation Act is significant b~cause the 
language of the Act is similar to that of~ 601 and the 
legislative history of the Act shows that Congress intendec, by 
tracking the wording of§ 601, to provide a private remedy. 
See, LloY2_ v. Regional Transportation Authori.tv, 548 F.2a 1277, 
1285-1286. The congressional debates surrounding the 1976 
Attorney's Fees Act also indicates that many members of 
Congress believed that Title VI created a private cause of 
action. See comments cited in Solicitor General's brief at 33 
n. 29. 
There are at least two other post-1964 enactments in which 
Congress has assumed that Title VI created a private action. 
In the Emergency School Aid Act, 20 u.s.c. ~~ 1601. et seq., 
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Congress provided that the prevailing party in a suit brought 
- "for failure to comply with any provision of this chapter or 
for discrimination on the basis of race, col.or, or national 
origin in violation of Title VT of the rivil_ Rights Act of 
1964 ..• "may be awarded attorney fees. 20 u.s.r. ~ 1_617. 
The other interesting post-lq64 enactment is the Fisca 1 
Assistance to State and Local Governments Act, 31 u.s.r•. ~~ 
1221 et seq. That Act contains a nondiscrimination provision 
that follows§ 601 verbatim, except that it also includes a 
prohibition against discrimination based on sex or age. 31 
u.s.c. § 1242. In 1976 Congress amended the Fiscal Assistance 
Act to provide specifically for private civj1_ actions to 
enforce the nondiscrimination principle. 31 u.s.c. ~ 1244; 
- see 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 5151_. Again, the 
consensus during the legislative debate was that a private 
cause of action already existed. See,~-, comments of 
Senator Brooke, 122 Cong. Rec. 15721; and of Senator Gravel, 
id. at 15724. 
E. Summary 
Although subsequent legislative history is not particularly 
reliable evidence of congressional intent in 1Q64, it 0oes len~ 
force to the argument that Congress has never viewed private 
causes of action as inimical to the purposes of ~it1e VT. 
Admittedly, however, evidence of specific legislative intent to 
- imply a cause of action is sparse. Asi0e from the 
post-enactment legislative hi.story, i.t consists of the broad 
language of~ 601 itself and comments made by opponents ot 
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Title VI that the Title would l ead to "thousanas of lawsuits." 
- See, ~.!.5l.=_, comments of Rep. Abernethy, 11.0 Cong. Rec. u;,q_ 
However, under Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 8?., such specific 
evidence is unnecessary~ instead, this portion of the ~ort 
test is only d i spositive i f the de f enaant can show that 
Congress intended to deny a private cause o f act i on. But 
evidence of that intent is also ext r emely sparse. the 
University's first two arguments are based entire l y on 
inferences that are no more compelling, and sometimes iess so, 
than the inferences which cou l d be drawn f rom the same facts to 
-
support a private cause of action. And the University's 
reliance on specific congressional statements is oniy 
persuasive if those statements are taken out of the context of 
the legislative debates in which they occurred. At most, those 
statements show rongress's re l uctance to a llow private 
individuals to sue to cut off funds, and a strong argume nt can 
be made that, even in that situation, a private cause of action 
should be implied. See 31 u.s.c. ~ 1244. In any event, it 
would appear that the most accurate assessment of congressional 
intent with respect to private causes of action is that 
Congress simply did not focus on the issue because it assumea 
that plaintiffs would be able to raise their individual 
challenges under provisions such as~ lq83. 
III. Waiver and Exhaustion: 
4t The briefs raise two peripheral issues that are worth 
discussing, if only briefly. The Solicitor General argues that 
the University never raised the defense of no cause of action 
-
-
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under Title VI below and that this ~ourt "may not reach issues 
that were neither presented to nor oecided by the state 
courts." Brief at 25. 'I'b_ere_ is, I think, si.gnifi.cant force to 
the argument. The petitioner here is not only attempting to 
raise a question never presented below, but that question, if 
decided in petitioner's favor, would not in any way support the 
judgment below. As · the following quote from McG01_arick v. 
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 309 u.s. 430, 434, 
illustrates the Court has been extreme1y wary of entertaining 
such arguments, particularly in cases arising from state courts: 
/ 
"fI] t is ••. the settled practice of this rourt, in the 
exercise of i.ts appel1_ate iuri.sdicti.on, that it is onlv in 
exceptional cases, and then on l y in cases coming from the 
) 
federal courts, that it considers questions urgen bv a 
petitioner or appellant not pressed or passed upon in the 
courts below .••. In the exercise of our appellate 
jurisdiction to review the action of state courts we shouia 
ourselves be free to set aside or revise their 
determinations only so far as they are erroneous ana error 
is not to be predicated upon their failure to ~eci~e 
questions not presented." 
The Court would certainly be justified under the McGoldrick 
principles in refusing to consider the University's private 
cause of action argument at this point. However, it ~oes not 
appear that there is an absolute iurisdictiona1 bar to 
consideration of the University's private cause of actjon 
argument. In Massachusetts v. Westcott, 43J. U.S. 322, the 
Court vacated a state court judgment and remanded the case for 
reconsideration in light of a decision indicating that there 
could be a statutory, rather than a constitutional, basis for 
4t providing the respondent the relief he sought. ~he statutorv 
issue does not appear to have been raised below. If the rourt 
can vacate and remand a state court iudgment under 
( 
76-811 - 29 -
these circumstances, i.t would seem to follow that it can also 
e reach the peripheral issue of whether there is · a private action 
under the statute, particularly if the r,ourt's resolution of 
the problem would support the lower court's iudgment. Of 
course, it would also be open for the rourt to treat the 
University's failure to raise the jssue below as an alternate 
ground of decision. 
-
Another argument put forward for the first time by the 
University in this Court is that Bakke's claim shoul~ be 
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
Again, it would be appropriate for the rourt, as the University 
in effect concedes, to refuse to consider the argument. On the 
merits, a good argument can be made that some form of 
administrative exhaustion is required by Title VI. Most or the 
cases requiring administrati.ve exhaustion un~er ~itle VT have 
arisen in the context of individual suits almed at cutting orf 
funds. See, ~-, NAACP v. Wi.lmi.ngton Medical r,enter, Inc., 
426 F. Supp. 919 (D. Del. 1977); Johnson v. Countv of rhester, 
413 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Some cases have, howeve~, 
suggested that there may be a requirement of exhaustion in 
private actions brought only to end a particular discriminatorv 
practice. See,~-, Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. 
Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The legislative history clearlv 
supports imposition of an exhaustion requirement in private 
actions to cut off funds; it is far more ambiguous with 
4t respect to private suits which do not seek to compel any 
particular agency action. See comments of Representative 
Celler, 110 Cong. 1519. In my view, however, the SoJicitor 
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General is correct in arguing {Brief at 30-31 n. 25) that the 
e Court need not decide the issue of administrative exhaustion in 
this case, since the record shows that Bakke filed an 
administrative complaint. Although the record does not also 
show what administrative steps were followed after this filing, 
the burden would be on the University to in~icate in what 
manner Bakke's administrative efforts fell short of ~itle VI 
requirements or in what manner it ~as pre~u~lced bv the 
administrative procedures actually followed. Since that bur~en 
is clearly not met here, I think the administrative exhaustion 
issue can be avoided. 
-
IV. Conclusion 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed that: 
"If there is one doctrine more deeply roote~ than anv othe r 
in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that 
we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality .. 
• unless such adjudication is unavoidable." Spector Motor 
Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105. 
In my judgment, there is no compelling reason not to apply 
this "deeply rooted" doctrine in this case. ~he respnn~Pnt 
presented his statutory claim below, and the issue has now been 
fully briefed. In case after case for the last ~eca~e, this 
Court and the lower federal courts have entertaine~ private 
causes of action under ~itle VT., and there js nothing in the 
legislative history of the Title that persuades me that a 
sudden reversal of course is warranted .. Instea0, the ~it1e is, 
- in many ways, archetypical legislatjon requiring a private 
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The most substantial argument against resting the 0ecision 
in this case on Title VI is not that there is no private cause 
of action under the statute, but that the rourt has an 
obligation to decide important constitutional_ issues such as 
this. Although I fully appreciate the force of this argumP~t, 
I cannot believe that we shou1.d abandon our normal pdncip1es 
of restraint to reach an issue that wi11_ have potentia11v far 
reaching and unforeseeable consequences on future social 
legislation. It is true that Title VI was, in 1arge part, 
intended to echo the constitutional prohibition against racial 
discrimination. But we are not bound by rongress' vlew of the 
Constitution in 1964, and the language of the statute may wel1 
independently proscribe conduct that the ronstitution 0oes 
not. The critical point is that a aecision based on ~it1.e VI - -
leaves room for legislative and executlve fl .exibility in areas 
where that is badly needed. "'Legislation,' Professor 
Frankfurter once wrote, 'is largely empirical.' And much of it 
is evanescent, and meant to be. Principle is intended to 
endure, and its formulation casts large shadows lnto the 
future." A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 1_31. Whlle the 
question of reverse discrimination obvious1y involves enauring -----------~------- ___...., ---- .....--""" ...... -
principles, I am convinced that it also poses problems unique - ---in our history and that the faults and virtues of many of the 
proposed solutions can only be adequately iudged on an 
"empirical" basis. The legislative arena is the proper forum 
for this sort of experimentation. A constitutional aecislon, 
regardless of the final result on the merits, poses the nanger, 
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Korematsu, that the rationalizing principle will "lie about 
like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of anv authority t~Rt 
can bring forward a plausible claim. • A military 
commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, an0 it 
is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing 
incident becomes the doctrine of. the r.onstitution. ~he~e it 
has a generative power of its own, and all that jt creates wi11 




December 29, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFEREN~E 
76-811 - Regents of the University of -~alifornia v. Allan Bakke 
Although I share the Solicitor General's u1.t5mate 
conclusion that an individual may maintain a cause of action 
under Title VI, I think a somewhat more careful consi~eration 
of the problem than is found in his brief is appropriate. Most 
of the following discussion is devoted to analyzing various 
pieces of Title VI's legislative history that appear to provide 
answers to the question whether Congress intended either to 
deny or to create a private remedy. Thls rather lengthy 
exegesis of legislative history is in response to what 1 
believe are inaccuracies presented by both sides. For 
instance, I do not think the Solicitor General is correct in 
saying that there is "no contemporaneous legisl.ative h~story 
concerning private actions." (Br. at 32). On the other hann, 
the University exaggerates the significance ann misstates the 
meaning of much of the legislative evidence on which lt 
relies. 
- By analyzing the legislative history in ~etail, however, 1 
do not mean to suggest that it provides the dispositive answer 
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here. In fact, I think the only conclusion that can be reached 
- with any confidence is that Congress d i_d not exp-r:-ess any 
particular hostility or approval towards prjvate causes of 
action. Framing the inquiry in terms of the four-part rort v. 
Ash te ~t, 422 u.s. at 78, this means that the second branch of 
that test is inconclusive in this case. The other three 
branches, however, unquestionably point towards an impliea 
cause of action. There is no serious controversy with respect 
to the first and fourth aspects of that test. In other words, 
assuming that Title VI applies to discrimination against a11 
races, Bakke's status as a potential beneficiary of a fe0era11y 
funded program definitely brings him within the "class for 
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted." Id. (emphasis 
- in original). And it is also clear that a cause of action based on race discrimination has not been "traditiona11y 
relegated to state law." Id 
The thjrd Cort test--whether an implied cause of action is 
consistent with the purposes of the legis 1 ative scheme--also 
overwhelmingly favors an implied private action. As will be 
shown, Title VI was enacted against a background of individual_ 
litigation seeking to stop the same practices against which 
Title VI was aimed. Congress generally approved of this 
litigation and believed that it would play a useful role in 
carrying out Title VI's purposes. And although I have grave 
doubts about attaching too much significance to subsequent 
- legislative history, it is apparent, 
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- see pp. 25-26, infra, that, since enactment of • 'I'itle VI, 
Congress has consistently viewed private actions as a 
complementary aspect of the Title's remedial scope. One can 
say, I suppose, that the subsequent i nterpretations of Titl.e VI 
by Congress, like the unanimous rulings of the lower federal 
courts and this Court's unanimous assumpti_on i n Lau v. Ni.chols, 
414 U.S. 563, indicate that the third portion of ~ort test is 
so decisively weighted towards the side of an implied cause of 
action that the issue would not have been regaraea as a serious 




In any event, the only real controversy is over the 
question whether there is any indication of legislative intent 
either to create or to deny a private remedy. As indicated, I 
am inclined to believe that this issue ultimatel_y boils aown to 
one's appraisal of sparse evidence which does not clearly point 
in either direction. In this situation, I think the the other 
three Cort factors control and lead to the conclusion that 
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I 
I. Remedy Necessary to Further Purposes of the Act: 
To date, the federal courts have unanimously ruled, or have 
assumed, that an individual may mainta i n a c a use of action 
under Title VI. See, e.g., Bossier Pa rish School Board v. 
Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967j, 6ert. denied, 388 U.S. 
911; Lau v. Nichols, supra. This unanimity reflects the 
general recognition that a private cause of action to enjoin 
discriminatory practices would further the remedia l purposes of 
Title VI. 
First, there can be no question but that Congr.ess, in 
enacting Title VI, intended to protect what i t viewed as 
important individua l rights. See, e.g., comments of 
Representative Linasay, l l0 Cong. Rec. 1540: 
"Everything in this proposed l eg i slat i on has to do with 
providing a body of law which will surround and protect the 
individual from some power complex. ~his bi l l is designed 
for the protection of individuals. When an individual is 
wronged he can invoke the protection to himself, but j f he 
is unable to do so because of economic d i stress or because 
of fear then the Federal Government is authorized to invo~e 
that individual protection for that individual .• " 




An equally strong thread of the 1egis1ative history is that 
Congress' dominant purpose was not to cut off funds, but to end 
discrimination. And the individual lawsuit was acknow 1 enged as 
an appropriate means of reaching that end. See, e.g., comments 
of Senator Ribicoff, 110 Cong. Rec. 7067: 
"Personally, I think it would be a rare case when funds 
would actually be cut off. In most cases, al_ternative 
remedies, principally lawsuits to end discrimination would 
be the preferable and more effective remedy. 1f a Negro 
child were kept out of a school receiving feoera1 funns, I 
think it would be better to get the Negro chila into school. 
than to cut off funds and impair the education of the white 
children." 
See also, comments of Senator Javits, 7.10 Cong. Rec. 7103; 
Senator Humphrey, id., at 5090. 
Implying a cause of action, espec i al l y where the action 
seeks only injunctive relief, thus fits precise1.y within the 
remedial purpose of the Title. Conversely, the failure to 
imply a cause of action could hinder those remedial purposes. 
In this case, as in others where the Court has implie~ a 
private right of action, the federal agencies' ability to 
insure compliance with the overriding goal of the 
statute--expressed here in~ n0l--is doubtful without the 
assistance of individual actions. See, e.g., Al.len v. State 
Board of Education, 393 U.S. 544, 556. In fact, it could we11 
be argued that Congress recognized that its remedial scheme 
deoended on the baJance 
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- between the existence of a broad, but selrom exercised 
power--federal fund cutoffs--and the existence of the narrow 
remedies available through indiviaua1 litigation. See comments 
of Senator Ribicoff, 110 Cong. Rec. at 7065: 
-
"We come then to the crux of the dispute--how this right 
[to participate in federally aided programs without 
discrimination] should be protected. And even th5.s issue 
becomes clear upon the most elementary analysis. If 
Federal funds are to be dispensed on a nondiscriminatory 
basis, the only possible remedies must fall into one of two 
categories: First, action to end discrimination; or 
second, action to end the payment of funds. Obviously 
action to end discrimination is preferable since that 
reaches the objective of extending the funds on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. But if the discrimination 
persists and cannot be effectively terminatea, how e1se can 
the principle of nondiscrimination be indicated except by 
nonpayment of funds?" 
Further evidence of the role private suits were to p1ay can 
be found in Congress' frequent and approving references to a 
contemporaneous, successful constitutionaJ chaJ1enge brought by 
individuals against a segregated hospital receiving Hill-Burton 
funds. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital. , 323 F.2a 
- 959 (CA4 1963), Qert. denied, 376 U.S. 938; see,~, r,omments 
of Sen. Humphrey, 110 Cong. Rec. 6543; Sen. Javits, id., at 
12719. These references clearly show that Congress knew that 
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- individual suits, aimed at stopping a particular discriminatory 
practice rather than cutting off funds, could and would be 
brought against recipients of federal funds--most obv i ously 
under§ 1983. And there is not the slightest indication in the 
legislative history that Congress intended agency action under 
§ 602 to supplant these individual su i ts~ nor is there any 
indication that these private actions were consideren 
incompatible in any way with the remedies proviaea in the 
remainder of the Title. 
-
Of course, it might be argued that, in enact i ng ~itle VT, 
Congress simply recognized the existence of individual suits 
which might parallel agency action under~ 602, but that any 
expansion of the individual's right to sue was considered 
unnecessary. In other words, the remedi_a l purposes of rriitie VI 
are satisfied if the individual can bring a constitutional 
challenge, presumably under~ 1983, against the p~rticular 
practice, and if that action is not available, then no further 
action fits within the congressional scheme. ~here are two 
possible responses to this argument. First, it has been 
suggested that there may be a cause of action under~ 1983 
here, even absent a cbnstitutional claim. Sect i on 601 may be 
viewed as a law protecting the sort of "rights, privileges, or 
immunities" covered by§ 1983. See Adickes v. Kress & ro., 3Q8 
U.S. 146, 150 n. 5. Under this view, ~ 1983, when read 
- together with§ 1343(3), provides a private cause of action for 
individuals claiming to be protected by a statute that provides 
for the "equal rights of citizens." The 
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- legislative history of§ 601, however, indicates that it is 
probably unnecessary to rely on this approach towards~ lq83. 
-
-
Section 601 is expressed in broad terms, and its 
prohibition is not directed solely at state action. Instean, 
both the main Senate sponsor of the ~lvil Rights ~t, Senator 
Humphrey, and the spokesman for Title VI i.tself, Senator 
Pastore, clearly stated, in almost identical. words, that the 
prohibition of§ 601 was intended to extend beyond the 
generally accepted limits of S 1983. 
"The purpose of Title VI is to make sure that funds of the 
United States are not used to support rac i al 
discrimination. In many instances the practices of 
segregation or discrimination, which ~itle VI seeks to en~, 
are unconstitutional. Th i s is clear l y so wherever Feeler al. 
funds go to a state agency which engages in racial 
discrimination. It may al.so be so where Federal func1s go 
to support private, segregated insti.tutions, under the 
decision in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 
F.2d 959 (CA4 1963), certificate denled fs i. c1, March 2, 
1964. In all cases, such discrimination is contrary to 
national policy, and to the moral sense of the Nation. 
Thus, Title VI is simply designed to insure that Federal 
funds are spent in accordance wlth the ronstitution anc1 the 
moral sense of the Nation." ll0 Cong. Rec. 6544, 7062. 
Or, as expressed by Senator Pastore, the principle of ~itle 
VI is that "fw]hen one dips one's hands into the Federal 
Treasury, a little democracy clings to whatever is withnrawn." 
110 Cong. Rec. 7063. Based on these and other broad statements 
on the scope and remedial goals of the Title, there would be no 
reason to impose a state action limitation on individual_ 
suits. Nothing in the legislative history suggests that ~ 1qs3 
marks the outer boundaries of possible private causes of action. 
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- Whether or not the Simkins dee is ion was to be fol lowed i.n other 
circuits, Congress evidenced its view that private causes of 
action would be appropriate against private institutions 
receiving federal funding. See, e.g., comments of Senator 
Javits, 110 Cong. Rec. 7102. This same point was made in the 
government's amicus brief in Lau v. Ni.chols as folJ.ows: 
-
"[T]he applicability of Title VI here does not depend upon 
the outcome of the equal protection analysis. Pursuant to 
the power of Congress to 'provide fin its expendituresl for 
the ... general welfare of the United States' (U.S. 
Constitution, Art. I, § 8, Cl. 1), enhanced like al.l other 
congressional powers by• Article I's 'necessary and proper' 
clause, the statute independently proscribes the con~uct 
challenged by petitioners and provides a ~iscrete basis ~or 
injunctive relief." Brief at 15. 
On the other hand, it is not entirely clear that an 
implied cause of action under Title VI shou1a, in all respects, 
go as far as§ 1983. An argument can be made that the remedial 
purposes of Title VI would be furthered by allowing private 
causes of action to e~join discriminatory practices, but not to 
impose damages. Briefly, the argument would be that Titl.e VI 
was not intended to provide compensation for niscrimjnatory 
practices, but only to end those practices, and the only 
monetary coercion available under the Title would be federal 
fund cutoffs, a remedy that a private litigant cannot seek, see 
discussion at p. 27, infra. 
In any event, these issues are not presented in Bakke. 
- Instead, Bakke's _suit is clearly the sort of private acti.on 
that Congress envisioned as a complementary aspect of the~ ~02 
cut-off provision. There is state action jn a program 
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concededly receiving substantial federal funds, and the private 
- litigant is seeking only admission to the program, not the 
termination of federal assistance. Congress expressed its 
conclusion that actions such as this could be brought and that 
these actions would further the remedial purposes of the ~it1e. 
-
-
II. Legislative Intent: 
Legislative intent has a very narrow meaning and purpose 
when used to support or counter a request to imply a cause of 
action. Although the language in some cases has suggested that 
the Court will not imply a cause of action without c 1 ear 
evidence of supporting legislative intent, see Nati.anal 
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad 
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458: Securities Investor Protection 
Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 420-421, that requirement has 
recently been qualified. "fI]n situations in which it is clear 
that federal law has granted a class of persons certain rights, 
it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private 
cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such 
cause of action would be controlling." Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S., 
at 82 (emphasis in original). That situation exists here. As 
indicated above, the legislative history overwhelmingly shows 
that Congress wanted to protect the personal right to be free 
from discrimination. Thus, the issue under this porti.on of the 
Cort test is whether Congress evidencea a specific intent to 
deny a private cause of action. 
In my view, this is the on1_y Cort criterion which creates 
any serious doubt over whether a cause of action should be 
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- implied. The Universjty presents essentially three arguments 
on legislative intent: (a) it points out that other Titles of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expli.cjtly create a private cause 
of action, but that Title VI does not; (b) it cl.aims that the 
remedial provisions of§ 602 were intended to be exclusive; 
and (c) it relies on certain specific statements maae auring 
the congressional debates. 
-
-
A. Comparison of Title VI with Other ~it~es: 
Titles II, III, IV, and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1Q64 
contain provisions specifically dealing with private causes of 
action. 42 u.s.c. E:;E:; 2000a-3 (a); b-2; c-8; and e-5 (f). 'T'itle 
VI, of course, does not contain such a provision. ~here are, 
however, several significant difficulties in drawing the 
negative inference that the University sugges~s from these 
facts. First, this Court has failed to draw such inferences in 
similar situations. For instance, in J.I. Case v. Barak, 377 
U.S. 426, the court impl.ied a cause of action unoer ~ 1_4 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even though~ 14--which was 
silent on the issue of private causes of action--was surrounaed 
by companion sections explicitly authorizing private actions. 
E.g.,§§ 16(b) and 18(a); see Piper v. Chris-Craft Innustri.es, 
430 U.S. 1, 24-25, cf. ~LRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 
147. As was stated in Cort v. Ash, this sort of "excursion 
into extrapolation of legislative intent ris] entirely 
unilluminating." 422 U.S., at 83 n. 14. It is unilluminating 
because, contrary to the University's assumption, there is more 
than one inference that can be 
76-811 - l2 -
logically and plausibly drawn from the f act that one section of 
- a piece of legislation does not mention private causes of 
action, while others do. Title VI is a case in point. 
-
The private action provisions in the Civil Rights Act are 
of two sorts. First, Titles VII ana II estabJish private 
actions that are significantly different in procedure ana/or 
remedy from the type of action that mi ght be implien. 'I'itl_es 
III and IV, on the other hand, merely state that "rnlothing in 
this subchapter shall affect adversely the r5ght of any person 
to sue" for the discriminatory practices covered by the 
subchapter. 42 u.s.c. ~~ 2000b-2 and c-8. It would be 
plausible to argue that the existence of the first provisions 
"merely reflects an intention to modify the remedies which 
might otherwise be implied, while leaving unqual i f i ec'l the - }"" 
See ~;: 
possible liability arising from v i olat i on" of Tit l e VI. 
(1963). The second provisions give rise to an even more 
interesting inference. The University argues that 'I' i tles 
and IV are ·similar to Title VI in that they create no new 
- V" ✓Y' .. 
substantive obligations. Brief, at 20 n. 3. If th ;s ;s AMI. ~ 
correct, and if there i.s a negative infer.ence to be c'lrawn from ~ ,, .rJ;.J ~ 
the fact that Title VI does not contai.n a "savings" clause such ~ Jr 
as 2000b-2 or c-8, then that inference must be that 'I'itle Vt J 
does "adversely affect" the right of individual.s to sue for 
discrimination in federally funded programs. Yet i.f anything 
- is clear from th~ legislative history of Title VI, i.t is that 
the Title was intended to expand, not restr ict, the methods 
available for ending discrimination. Congress' approval. of 
\ 
private causes of action cha l lenging discrimination is mr n i fest 
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from the debates, seep. 6, su~.!.. and certain1.y refutes any 
- claim that the lack of a "savings" clause should be interpreted 
as adversely affecting pre-existing individual rights. It 
would be far more consistent with the legislative history of 
the Title to argue that the absence of a "savings" provision 
indicates that Congress left open the possibility that ~itle VT 
would actually further the rights of persons to -sue for 
discrimination in federally funded .programs. Or perhaps more 
persuasively, it could be argued that Title VI did not requi~e 0P·~ 
a "savings" provision because it does not authorize the 
Attorney General to sue on behalf of the individual. See 






either of these inferences is more compe J. 1 i ng than the 
University's negative inference; it is sufficient that the 
University's evidence of legislative intent is no more 
compelling than the similar evidence reiected in Cort as 
"unilluminating." 
B. Relationship Between§§ 601 ana 602: 
~~v 
Focusing on the legislative aebates over whether federal 
loans and repayment guarantees were covered by Title VI, the 
University argues that agency action under~ 602 was intenaed 
to be the exclusive method for enforcing~ 601. It claims that 
the debates reveal that the "sole function of~ 601 would be to 
lay a predicate for administrative act i on under~ 602." Brief, 
- at 19. This claim is suspect for two reasons. First, the 
debates were not even tangentially related to the issue of 
private causes of action. Second, even if the br.oan subiect 
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- matter of the debates were viewed as touching the private cause 
of action question, the debates are of little assistance in 




The specific statutory issue involved in these debate s was 
whether the language excluding federal loan guarantees from 
Title VI coverage shou l d be placed in~ 601 as weJ1 as~ 602. 
Generally speaking, the proponents of ~itle VI took the 
position that it was sufficient to place the language in~ 602 
alone, while the opponents wanted the 1_imitation expressed in ~ 
601. During the course of this debate, there were a number of 
comments by Title VI's supporters to the effect that~ 60t 
merely established a broad principle and that the enforcement 
of that principle was limited by§ 602. See, e.g., r.omments of 
Senator Humphrey, ll0 Cong. Rec. 13378: 
"First of all, § 601 states general po l icy. Section 6 02 
states the means of effectuating that general policy, the 
implementation and the exclusion. The exc l usi.on rel.ates 
to, as the language says, other than a contract of 
insurance or guaranty. So FDir--Fed e r al Deposit I nsurance 
Corporation--and a ll activities pertain i ng thereto are 
eliminated. The Federal Housing Admin i stration i_s 
eliminated." 
Even assuming that this viewpoint prevaiJed in rongress, it 
still does not answer the question whether rongress i.nten~ed to 
deny a private cause of action. The Un i versity's argument is 
that, since Title VI's supporters argued that the scop e of the .. 
Title could be limited by amending only~ 602, that section 
must be viewed as providing the excJ.usive form of 
relief--ag ency action. This use of the debate over ~S 601. and 
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- 602 suggests that the choice before Congress was, on the one 
hand, agency action under~ 602, or, on the other, private 
action under§ 601. If that were true, then comments such as 
Senator Humphrey's would offer strong proof that Congress 
intended to preclude the possibility of private causes of 
action. In fact, that is not the case1 
-
The issue before Congress was whether~ 601 authorized 
federal agencies to act in areas not covered by~ 602--in 
particular, housing. The President had issued a limited order 
requiring nondiscrimination in federaJ. hous i ng, and the 
opponents of Title VI feared that§ 601 would be reaa as giving 
executive authority for more expansive orders. See, e.g., 
Comments of Senator Robertson, n .o Cong. Rec. 74 1 9: of Senator 
Long, id., at 13435; and of Senator Gore, i d.Lat 1333?.. By 
placing the "guarantee exception" l anguage in~ 601, as well as 
§ 602, these Senators wanted to make sure that no "open 
housing" orders would be issued in the future, and that the 
existing orders issued by the Pres i dent would be 
countermanded. See, ~~, Comments of Senator Sparkman, 1_1_0 
Cong. Rec. 7092; 7558; and of Senator Stennis, io., at 70Q2. 
The proponents of Tit le VI wanted the limiting language pJace<'l 
only in S 602. The surface explanation for this was that they 
wanted to preserve the general principle of~ 601 intact and 
without exceptions. See, e.g., Comments of Senators Pastore 
- and Keating, 110 .Cong. Rec. 13437. The more practical. reason 
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- was that the opponents' amendment to ~ 601 mi ght negatively 
affect the existing Executive nond i scrim i nation orders. See, 
e.g., Comments of Senator Gore, 110 Cong. Rec. 13376; Senator 
Humphrey, id., at 13929. 
-
A search through these debates reveals no mention of 
private causes of action. The issue was whether~ 602 was the 
exclusive source of authorization for agency action, not 
whether agency action was the exclusive remedy for ~itle VI 
~ iola tions. See,~~ summary of debate at 110 Cong. Rec. 
13930-13931. It would be entirely consistent with the 
structure of Title VI and the debate over~~ 601 and 602 to 
argue that, while§ 602 establishes 1imits on agencv action, 
does not establish that agencies alone may take action to 
effectuate the purposes of§ 601. 
A further difficulty with the University's argument is 
simply that the debate on which i.t re1i.es--even assuming that 
it is substantially related to the private action issue--ended 
without any clear resolution of the question whether~ EiOl has 
any significance independent of~ 602. As the Senator.s 
themselves admitted, there was a good deal of confusion over 
the combined effect of§~ 601 and 602 on Executive orders in 
areas such as housing, and on the relationship between the 
sections in general. See,~' Comments of. Senator Humphrey, 
- 110 Cong. Rec. 1;3436; Senator Ribicoff, id.Lat 13332. Even 
towards the end of the debate, supporters as we11 as opponents 
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- of Title VI argued that § 602 did not 1.imit § 60l. See, ~~ 
Comments of Senator Case, 110 Cong. Rec. 13930. ~he 
controversy was finally resolved when Congres8 0ecided to add~ 
605 to Title VI. That section provides that "rnlothing in th i s 
subchapter shall add to or detract from any existing authority 
with respect to any program or activity un0er which Fenera1 
financial assistance is extended by way of a contract of 
insurance or guarantee." In other words, Congress 
-
-
compromised. The proponents of Title VI did not want to rjsk 
the possibility that an amendment to ~ 60J. wouia be read as an 
endorsement of discrimination in housing and thus an overruling 
of existing Executive housing orders; the opponents did not 
want to risk the possibility that§ 601 would be read as 
allowing agency action even beyond that provided for in~ 602. 
The need for a compromise position and a separate section 
could easily be interpreted as supporting a conclusion that~ 
601 has independent significance. After a1_1, there wou10 be no 
reason to state that "nothing rin ~itle VIl shall add" to 
existing authority with respect to federal contracts of 
insurance a guarantee, unless~ 601 could be tnterprete~ as 
providing that additional authority. Regardless of the impact 
of§ 605, however, it is clear that the~ 601/~602 0ebate does 
not reveal any congressional hostility or disapproval of 
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c. Specific Statements: 
I have found three statements in the 1_egislative history 
explicitly mentioning that Title VI does not create a private 
cause of action (two of these are referred to by the 
University). They are as folJ.ows: 
"Senator Keating: Parenthetical1.y, while we favored the 
inclusion of the right to sue on the part of the agency, 
the State, or the facility which was deprivea of federal 
funds, we also favored the inclusion of a provision 
granting the right to sue to the person suffering from 
discrimination. This was not inciuaen in the bi11_. 110 
Cong. Rec. 7065. 
"Representative Gill: Nowhere i_n this sec_tion do you fino 
a comparable right of legal action for a person who fee1s 
he has been denied his rights to participate in the 
benefits of federal funds. Nowhere. on1y those who have 
been cut off can go to court and present their claim. ll0 
Cong. Rec. 2467. 
"Senator Kuchel: As can be clearly seen, Title VI is, in 
reality, a series of restrictions on executive action which 
I believe could now be taken and ought to be taken. In 
fact, a good case could be made that a reme~v is provi0ea 
for the State or local official who is practicing 
discrimination, but none is provided for the victim of the 
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Read alone, each of these statements seems · to provide 
evidence of legislative intent to deny a private action. Read 
in context, however, they appear to be f ar more ambiguous, or 
simply not directed towards an individual. suit to enjoin a 
discriminatory practice. 
For instance, Representative Gi l l's comments, wh j cl-i contain 
the most emphatic denial of a private right oF action, appear, 
in context, to be concerned only with lndividual suits to cut 
off federal funds, not with suits to enioin a discriminatory 
practice. His comments occurred in response to the cla i.m that, 
after Title VI, the courts would be "c l uttered" with indlvi~ual 
suits brought to obtain judicial review of an agency's decision 
not to cut off funds, romments of Representative Poft, 11.0 
Cong. Rec. 2464, and were preceded by the following 
observations: 
"If you will look at Title VI, you will see very clear1y 
that we have here a relative l y mild form of cut-off 
provisions. ~here is no mandatory or arbitrary stopping ot 
funds • • 
"It requires that any action taken be 'consistent with 
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing 
the financial assistance.' It states that compliance wi11 
be asked for . under two possible routes. One is ter.mination 
and the other is by any other means authorized by law. 
-
-
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"Further, Title VI provides very clearly that the person or 
the agency which is denied the money, if it desires, can go 
to the courts .•. and that court can determine whether or 
not the cut-off is in accord with the law an~ whether or 
not it was properly done under this statute. 
"Nowhere in this section do yo"u find a comparable right of 
leg al action . . • etc." 110 Cong. Rec. 246 6-246 7 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, the assurance that the legislat i on wou1n create no 
private cause of action was directl_y l inked to actions to 
terminate federal financial assistance. These assurances must 
be contrasted to the approving refe r ences to Si.mkins v. Moses 
H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (CA4 1963), seep. 6, 
supra. 
Senator Kuchel's comments, supr~ also occur in the context 
of a discussion of when and how federal funds couln be cut off 
under the Title, and , in any event, they are far from 
dispositive since he simply states that a "good case" could be 
made for the lack of a private action. Of the three 
statements, Senator Keating's appears to give the University 
its most substantial support. On the face of the statement, 
the Senator merely states the obvious ~-Titl.e VI contains no 
- explicit provision for a private cause of action--ana, in fact, 
he indicates that he would favor such an action. The 
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- implication of the statement, however, is that hi.s 
view--favoring a private cause of action--was reiected in the 
developing stages of Title VI. To determine whether this 
inference is warranted, some discussion of the background of 
Senator Keating's comment is necessary. 
-
Senator Keating proposed an amendment to Title VI (then S. 
1731) on August 9, 1963. It provided iudicial review of any 
agency decision respecting the cut off of funds for both the 
funded program and the intended benefic i arv. 1 09 rong. Rec. 
14639-14640. ~he amendment did not provide for a private cause 
of action to enjoin discriminatory practices. Four days later, 
S~nator Ribicoff proposed an amendment which all.owed the 
Attorney General to bring a civil act i on to en~oin federa11y 
funded programs from engaging in discriminatory pract i ces. 1oq 
Cong. Rec. 14833-14835. Senators Ribicoff an0 Keating then 
combined their proposals into one proposal which contained (a) 
judicial review of agency decisions for the beneficiaries as 
well as the recipients of federal funding: (b) authorization 
for the Attorney General to bring civil iniunctive actions: and 
(c) a provision allowing private causes of action. lOQ rong. 
Rec. 15375. 
As Senator Keating pointed out, 110 Cong. Rec. 7065, the 
Administration revised its version of ~itJe V1 shortly after 
- the Keating-Ribicoff Amendment was presented in the Senate. 
That revision, which tracks the current provisions of ~itle VI 
in most material respects, contained none of the three 
proposals 
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- referred to su~ However, it is extremely aifficuit to say <? 
that the failure to include a private cause of action provisjon 
reflects in any way a congressional lntent to ~eny such an 
-
action. 
First, the Attorney General, in commenting on the 
Administrator's revised bill, gave no indication that there was 
any opposition to a private cause of action, see Hearings on S. 
1731 and S. 1750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., before the rommittee 
on the Judiciary, at 333 et seq., nor was such opposition 
voiced at any time during the leglslative struggle over the 
Civil Rights Act. Instead, the legislative historv suggests 
that the Attorney General's opposition to the Keating-Ri_bicoff 
proposal was based on that office's unwllJ.ingness to assume 
responsibility for a broad range of civil litigation. ~he 
Title VI Amendment was part of a broader amendment to Part TII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 which woula have autl-iorizecl the 
Attorney General to institute an iniuncti.ve suit in a civil 
rights case where an individual's Fourteenth or First Amendment 
rights were being violated. See Comments of Senator ,Javits, 
109 Cong. Rec. 14921. According to Senator Keating, the 
Attorney General only wanted the power to bring civil 
injunctive suits with respect to the publ_jc accommoclations and 
public education provisions of the Civil Rights Act. See 1oq 
Cong. Rec. 19739-19743. If this is the reason why the 
- Administration did not incorporate the Keating-Ribicoff 
proposal into its bill, it would have l_ittle bearing on whether 
or not the Administration favored a private cause of action 
under the Title. 
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- More importantly, although the Administration bil.1 aia not 
-
-
contain a specific private cause of action prov i sion, it did 
substantially rewrite the language of~ 601. The Solicitor 
General's brief argues that, if~ 601 had not been intended to 
create enforceable persona l rights, the section wou10 have 
read: "No program discriminat i ng on account of ·r ace shall. 
receive federal funds." (Brief . at 28). Yet this is 
essentially how§ 601 read as introduced into the Senate, see 
Hearings, supra, at 11, 20, and as rep r o0uced in the 
Keating-Ribicoff proposal, 110 r::ong. Rec. 1_5375 (" ••• no such 
assistance shall be furnished un 1 ess i n the administration of 
the program or activity, no discrimination is practicea .. 
"}. The Administration proposal, for the first t i me, 
introduced the language "fn]o person. shall be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or act i vity 
receiving Federal financial assistance." In li ght of this very 
substantial change, which expressed the prohibition of~ 601 in 
terms of a personal right, it seems unl i kely that the 
Administration intended to foreclose the possibility of: priv~te 
actions to enjoin discriminatory practices. 
Finally, it should be noted that Senator Keating's 
statement, supra, may be read, like the others, as referring 





cut-offs. On its face, such an interp re tation is reasonable, ~,~' .,)II 
since the preceding clause ;n his statement reFers to review oF ~ rl~ 
fund cut-offs. That interpretation is al.so substantial.1.y ,/_,.t ~ 
supported by the legislative background of his proposal, 
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outlined above. As indicated, Senator Keating's initial. 
9 concern was to provide for ind i.v idua l review of agency 
decisions to cut off funds, seep. 21, supra, ana his statemP.nt 
before the Judiciary Committee on the Aoministration bill 
reflects the same concern: 
-
"There is only one respect in which •.. there is anv 
material departure from the amendment offerer bv Senator 
Ribicoff and myself •... That is, there is no provision 
in this amendment for enforcement p r oceeaings bv the 
victims of unremedi.ed discrimination .... tf the states 
can obtain iudicial review where funas are unfairly 
withheld, as the Attorney General proposes in this 
amendment, the victjms of discrimination, it seems to me, 
should have access to the courts where the funas are 
unfairly granted. Th -i.s seems to me onlv elemental fairness 
and it should be the right of judicial revi.ew to both 
parties that was included in our amendment." Hearings, 
supra, at 335. 
Examination of the background of Senator Keating's 
statement thus reveals two points: First, given the Senator's 
primary concern with judicial review of agency decision to 
cut-off funds, it is not at all clear that his statement was 
meant to encompass private causes of action tQ enioin 
discriminatory practices. Second, even if the statement noes 
encompass such a private action, it does not foll .ow that it is 
an expression of congressional intent to ~env a private 
action. As indicated, the concern wi.th the Keati.ng-Ribicoff 
amendment appears to have been far removed from the private 
action issue. The importance of the Keating-Ribicoff 
amendment, therefore, seems very similar to that of the 
"Meador" amendment, which the University concedes is not 
helpful to its position (see Brief at 21 n 5). Both mention 
- private causes of action, and both were reiected, but nei.ther 
were clearly rejected on grounds that reflected congressional. 
intent with respect to private causes of action. 
-
-
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D. Other Evidence of Legislative Intent 
The Solicitor General points out that post-enactment 
legislative history supports the conclusion that Title VI 
creates a private cause of action. Congress has twice amenc'le~ 
Title VI since the Fifth Circuit decided that there was a 
private cause of action under the Tit l e, Bossie r Parish School 
Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (1967), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 
911, but at neither time has i.t inoicated disapproval. of the 
Bossier ruling. See 84 Stat. 121 (adding~ 2000d-6); and 81 
Stat. 787 (amending~ 2000d-5). More si.gnificantlv, in several 
recent enactments, Congress has assumed that Titl_e VI creates a 
private cause of action. The SoJ.icitor Genera 1 's brief 
mentions two of these enactments--the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 (Brief at 33 n. 30), 29 u.s.c. § 7q4, and the 1q7n rivi 1 
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 u.s.r.. () 1q88 (Brief at 
32). The Rehabilitation Act is sign i ficant because the 
language of the Act is similar to that of~ 601 and the 
legislative history of the Act shows that Congress i.ntenoeo, by 
tracking the wording of§ 601, to provide a pr.i.vate remedy. 
See, LloYQ_ v. Reg ion al Tr anspor tat ion Author i tv, 54 8 F. 2c'l 1_ 277, 
1285-1286. The congressional debates surrounding the 1976 
Attorney's Fees Act also indicates that many members of 
Congress believed that ~itle VI created a private cause of 
action. See comments cited :in Solicitor Genera7_'s br.ief at 33 
n. 29. 
There are at least two other post-1964 enactments in which 
Congress has assumed that Title VI created a private action. 
In the Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U. S .c. ()~ 1601_ et seq., 
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Congress provided that the prevailing party in a suit brought 
"for failure to comply with any provision of this chapter or 
for discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national 
origin in violation of Title VI of the r.ivi1_ Rights Act of 
1964 ••. "may be awarded attorney fees. 20 u.s.r. ~ 1_617. 
The other interesting post-lq64 enactment is the Fiscal 
Assistance to State and Local Government s Act, 31 -u.s.r. ~E; 
1221 et seq. That Act contains a nondiscrimination provision 
that follows§ 601 verbatim, except that it also includes a 
prohibition against discrimination based on sex or age. 31 
u.s.c. § 1242. In 1976 Congress amended the Fiscal Assistance 
Act to provide specifically for private civfl_ actions to 
enforce the nondiscrimination principle. 31 u.s.c. ~ 1244: 
see 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 5151_. Again, the 
e consensus during the legislative debate was that a private 
cause of action already existed. See,~-, comments of 
Senator Brooke, 122 Cong. Rec. 15721: and of Senator Gravel, 
id. at 15724. 
E. Summary 
Although subsequent legislative history is not particularly 
reliable evidence of congressional intent in 1Q64, it 0oes ien~ 
force to the argument that Congress has never viewed private 
causes of action as inimical to the purposes of ~it1e VI. 
Admittedly, however, evidence of specifi.G l egislative intent to 
e imply a cause of action is sparse. Asi0e from the 
post-enactment legislative history, it consists of the broad 
language of~ 601 itself and comments made by opponents of 
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Title VI that the Title would lead to " t housan<ls of lawsuits." 
- See, ~-=-9...!., comments of Rep. Abernethy, 110 Cong. Rec. 1_6,q. 
-
-
However, under Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 8?., such specific 
evidence is unnecessary; instead, this portion of the Cort 
test is only dispositive if the defen~an t can show that 
Congress intended to deny a private cause of action. But 
evidence of that intent is also extremely sparse. the 
University's first two arguments are based entirely on 
inferences that are no more compelling, and sometimes 1ess so, 
than the inferences which could be drawn from the same facts to 
support a private cause of action. And the University's 
reliance on specific congressional statements is oniy 
persuasive if those statements are taken out of the context of 
the legislative debates in which they occurred. At most , those 
statements show Congress's reluctance to allow p rivate 
-
individuals to sue to cut qff fpods , and a strong arqument can 
be made that, even in that situation, a private cause of Rcti0n 
should be implied. See 31 u.s.c. ~ 1244. In any event, it 
would appear that the most accurate assessment of congressional 
intent with respect to private causes of action is that 
Congress simply did not focus on the issue because it assumed 
that plaintiffs would be able to raise their individual 
challenges under provisions such as~ 1_q93_ 
III. Waiver and Exhaustion: 
The briefs raise two peripheral issues that are worth 
discussing, if only briefly. The So1lcitor General argues that 
the University never raised the defense of no cause of action 
7 
Sir~ · 
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under Title VI below and that this ~ourt "may not reach issues 
- that were neither presented to nor 0~c j.,ded h y the s t ate , 
courts." Brief at 25. 'l'here is, I think, significant Force to 
the argument. The petitioner here is not only attempting to 
raise a question never presented below, but that question, if 
decided in petitioner's favor, would not in any way support the 
judgment below. As the follow i ng quote from McGolartck v. 
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 3Oq U.S. 430, 434, 
illustrates the Court has been extremely wary of entertaining 
such arguments, particularly in cases arising rrom state courts: 
-
"fIJ t is .•• the settled practice of thi.s rourt, in the 
exercise of its appellate iurisdiction, that it is ontv in 
exceptional cases, and then on l y in cases coming from the 
federal courts, that i t considers questions urgen by a 
petitioner or appellant not pressed or passed upon in the 
courts below •••. In the exercise of our appe l late 
jurisdiction to review the action of state courts we should 
ourselves be free to set asiae or revise their 
l 
determinat i ons on l y so far as they are erroneous ana error J r.JI"(! 
is not to be p redicated up on their failure to aeci(1e · 
quest i ons not p resented." 
The Court would certainly be justified under the McGotarick 
principles in refusing to consider the University's private 
cause of action argument at this point. However, it aoes not 
appear that there is an absolute iurisdictional bar to 
consideration of the University's private cause of action 
argument. In Massachusetts v. Westcott, 43J. U.S. 322, the 
Court vacated a state court judgment and remanded the case for 
reconsideration in light of a decision inaicatlng that there 
could be a statutory, rather than a constitutional, bas i s for 
- providing the respondent the relief he sought. ~he statutorv 
issue does not appear to have been raised below. If the rourt 
can vacate and remand a state court iuogment under 
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these circumstances, it would seem to follow that it can a1so 
- reach the peripheral issue of whether there is a p r ivate act j on 
under the statute, particularlv if the Court's resoiution of 
the problem would support the lower court's iudgment. Of 
course, it would also be open for the rourt to treat the 
University's failure to raise the issue be l ow as an alternate 
ground of decision. 
-
Another argument put forward for the first time by the 
University in this Court is that Bakke's cla i m shou1~ be 
dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
Again, it would be appropriate for the rourt, as the Unlversity 
in effect concedes, to refuse to consider the argument. On the 
merits, a good argument can be made that some form of 
administrative exhaustion is required by Tit1e VI. Most of the 
cases requiring administrative exhaustion un~er ~it1e VT have 
arisen in the context of individual suits afmed at cutting off 
funds. See, ~-, NAACP v. Wi.lmi.ngton Medical Center, Inc., 
426 F. Supp. 919 (D. Del. 1977); Johnson v. Countv of rhester, 
413 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Some cases have, however, 
suggested that there may be a requirement of exhaustion in 
private actions brought only to end a particu1ar discriminatory 
practice. See, ~-, Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. 
Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The legislative history c1ear.1v 
supports imposition of an exhaustion requirement in private 
actions to cut off funds; it is far m0re ambiguous with 
- respect to private suits which do not seek to compel anv 
particular agency action. See comments of Representative 
Celler, 110 Cong. 1519. In my view, however, the Solicitor 
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General is correct in arguing (Brief at 30-31 n. 25) that the 
- Court need not decide the issue of administrative exhaustion in 
this case, since the record shows that Bakke fi l ed an 
admini~trative compla i nt. Although the reco r d does not also 
show what administrative steps were followed after this filing, 
the burden would be on the Univers i t y to ina i cate in what 
manner Bakke's administrative efforts fe l l short of Title VI 
requirements or in what manner it was preiud i ced bv the 
administrative procedures actually followed. Since that bur~en 
is clearly not met here, I think the adm i nistrative exhaustion 
issue can be avoided. 
-
IV. Conclusion 
Mr. Justice Frankfu r ter observed that: 
"If there is one doctr i ne more de eply roo t ed than anv other 
in the process of const i tutiona l adiudication, it is th a t 
we ought not to pass o n questions o f cons t i t utionalitv .• 
• unless such adjud i c a t i on is unavoi dab l e." Spector Motor 
Co. v. McLaugh l in, 323 U.S. 10 1 , 105. 
In my judgment, there is no compe l ling reason not to apply 
this "deeply rooted" doctrine in th i s case. The respnn~Pnt 
p~esented his statutory claim below, and the issue has now been 
fully briefed. In case after case f or the last ~eca~e, this 
Court and the lower federal courts have enterta i ned private 
causes of action under Tjtle VI, ana there js nothing in the 
legislative history of the Title that persuades me that a 
sudden reversal of course is warranted. Insteaa, the ~itle is, 
- in many ways, archetypical l eg i slation requiring a private 
cause of action to effectuate i ts remed i al purposes. 
-
-
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The most substantial argument against resting the ~ecision 
in this case on Title VI is not that there is no private cause 
of action under the statute, but that the rourt has an 
obligation to dec i de i mportant constitutional issues such as 
this. Although I f ul l y appreciate the force of this argumP~t, 
I cannot believe that we shou1.d abandon our normal pdnciples 
of restraint to reach an issue that will_ have potentia1_1v far 
reaching and unforeseeable consequences on future social 
legislation. It is true that Title VI was, in large part, 
intended to echo the constitutionaJ. prohibition against r acial 
discrimination. But we are not bound by rongress' view of the 
Constitution in 1964, and the language of the statute may well 
independently proscribe conduct that the ronstitution ~oes 
not. The critical point is that a aecision based on ~itle VI 
leaves room for legislative and executive f1.exibi1ity i n areas 
where that is badly needed. "'Legislation,' Professor 
Frankfurter once wrote, 'is largely empirical.' And much of it 
is evanescent, and meant to be. Principle is intended to 
endure, and its formulation casts large shadows into the 
future." A. Bicke 1, The Least Dangerous Branch 1_31 • Wh i_ 1 e the 
question of reverse discrimination obviously involves enauring 
principles, I am convinced that it also poses probl_ems unique 
in our history and that the faults and virtues of many of the 
proposed solutions can only be adequately iudged on an 
"empirical" basis. The legislative arena is the proper forum 
tit for this sort of. experimentation. A constitutional neci.sion, 
regardless of the final result on the merits, poses the nanger, 
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Korematsu, that the rationalizing principle will "lie about 
like a loaded weapon ready for the hana of any authority t~at 
can bring forward a plausible claim. . A mili.tarv 
commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionali.tv, an0 it 
is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing 
incident becomes the doctrine of the r.onstitution. ~her.e it 
has a generative power of its own, ·and all that it creates will 
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No. 76-811 Regents v. BakkP 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
I 
The combination of the Chief's invitation to 
circulate memoranda and our deferral of a definitive 
Conference vote have resulted in an unprecedented volume of 
circulations in this case. Although my first i mpu lse is to 
"cringe" when I see another one, each memorandum has been 
educational for me and - in a case of this importance - the 
exchange of views has b een a welcome supplement to our usual 
truncated Conference discussion. I nevertheless am hesitant 
to impose upon you yet another memorandum. But John 's 
thoughtfu l essay of December 29 (that e nli ghtened my New 
Year's weekend) emboldens me to do so. 
* * * * 
I voted not to reques t supplemental bri efs on the 
Title VI issue because I believed that we could not 
responsibly follow a Title yr route to avoidance of the 
constitutional problem . Now tha t we have requested brie fs , 
our opinion of course must address the statutory p roblem 






Ashwander principles in support of affirmance under Title VI 
alone reads too much into Justice Brandeis' admonition. It 
is not a license for invariable recourse to statutory 
interpretation. See G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 1 ~04 (9th 
ea. 1975). 
Nor do our "normal principles of restraint" 
invariably counsel the decision of difficult statutory 
issues not passed upon by the court below, in order always 
to avoid a properly presented constitutional question. As 
recently as last Term in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), we 
reached the equal protection issue even though the Court of 
Appeals, "proceeding in a somewhat unorthodox fashion, did 
not decide the statutory [Title YIII] question." ra. at 
271. And while I am in agreement with the quotation from 
Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (194 4 ), 
quoted in John's Dec. 29 Memorandum, at 30, it should be 
noted that the holding of that case was that a 
constitutional issue could not even be presented until 
questions of local law had been answered in a certain 
manner. The Court viewed the lower federal courts as 
incompetent to provide those answers. Hence, the case was 
remanded to the District Court with instructions to retain 
jurisdiction pending the initiation of state proceedings to 






blocks the presentation of the constitutional issue in this 
case. 
As I understand John's position on the substance 
1 
of the Title yr argument, ~e agrees that "Title yr was, 
in large part, intended to echo the constitutional 
prohibition against racial discrimination." See John's Dec. 
29 Memorandum to the Conference, at 31. In view of 
Thurgood's Oct. 28 Memorandum to the Conference, the 
Solicitor General's Supplemental Brief, and my own research, 
I think that conclusion is clearly correct. The next 
question is whether -- because of prudential considerations 
-- we should read a broader meaning into the legislative 
2 
history or rely on a perceived ''plain meaning" of 
§2000d, in order to avoid reaching the Fourteenth Amendment 
issue. It seems to me that either of these approaches 
1/ Although the question whether there exists an 
implied right of action under Title VI is a close one for 
me, I am inclined to think that petitioner has waived any 
objection to respondent's assertion of a cause of action 
under the statute. The Solicitor General's Supplemental 
Brief, combined with our reaching the merits in Lau v. 
Nichols, 414 U.S. 565 (1974), is quite persuasive on this 
point. See Supplemental Brief for the SG, at 24-25. 
2/ I place this phrase in quotation marks to 
emphasize-that the only thing even close to being ''plain" 
about the meaning of§ 2000d is that Congress seemed to 
think it meant the same thing as the Equal Protection 
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would represent a departure from the normal decision-making 
processes of this Court and could be justified only by a 
basic judgment about the nature of the racial problem in 
this country a~d the institutional role of this Court. 
I believe that it would be very difficult to write 
a defensible opinion holding that the legislative history 
supported a reading of Title yr going beyond the Equal 
Protection Clause. Thurgood's Oct. 28 Memorandum on that 
subject and the SG's Supplemental Brief are convincing on 
that point. Among other things, they make it clear that 
Congress purposely refrained from defining "discrimination" 
in§ 2000d, thereby leaving the nondiscrimination principle 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and other federal statutes to 
infuse§ 2000d with meaning. See Thurgood' memo at 6-7, 
and sources cited therein; SG's Supplemental Brief at 9-10 
& n.5. To say that Congress in enacting Title yr was 
contemplating a departure from the Fourteenth Amendment 
would be quite a judicial tour de force. 
Even if one views the language of Title VI as 
arguably having a meaning different fron1 the Fourteenth 
Amendment (a view I cannot accept), a fair resolution of 
its meaning hardly could be made without recourse to the 
legislative history. Only two Terms ago we held that 





used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be 
no "rule of law" which forbids its use, however clear the 
words may appear on "superficial examination,"'" Train v. 
Colorado Public Interest Research Groue, 425 U.S. 1, 10 
5. 
(1976), quoting United States v. Americ?n Trucking Assns., 
310 U.S. 534, 543-544 (1940). A disregard of Congress' 
apparent purpose ("to echo the constitutional prohibition") 
and the expanding of Title _VI into an independent, 
broad-gauge prohibition would - as I view it - be quite 
difficult to justify. 
Thus, it strikes me that the decision to affirm on 
the basis of Title VI alone would represent a departure 
from our usual methods of adjudication. It would be "worth 
the candle" only if it furthered some extremely important 
prudential consideration. 
John believes that it does. The prudential 
considerations that he advances for avoidance of a 
constitutional decision are based upon his view - as I 
understand it - that reverse discrimination "poses problems 
unique in our history", see John's memo at 31, problems 
that may work themselves out in the short run, obviating 
any need to make a constitutional judgment at this time. 
If there were reasonable assurance that this "unique" 
problem would resolve itself in the foreseeable future, 





But there is no evidence that this pioblem will "go away". 
When Defunis was here three years ago, we avoided - I 
thought on sound grounds - the constitutional issue. We 
were criticized then for leaving the hundreds of state 
colleges, universities and graduate schools without 
guidance. The need for resolution of the issue certainly 
has not lessened. 
6. 
If the Court now were to affirm this case on Title 
VI without reaching the Fourteenth Amendment, again we will 
have resolved finally exactly nothing. I suppose (from 
what has been said) that such an opinion would hold only 
that the language of Title YI proscribes the precise type 
of reverse discrimination found to exist by the courts 
below. Every state institution of higher learning in our 
country would then have to terminate forthwith all 
Davis-type programs. Institutions with Harvard-type 
programs, or some variation thereof, would have no idea 
whether they were in compliance with the law. Nor, ind e ed, 
would HEW, which provides funds to virtually all of these 
institutions. Inevitably, after some presently 
indeterminate time - perhaps another two to three years -
the constitutional issue will again be before us. 
There is no reason to believe that in so short a 
span of time the socio-economic position of racial and 





end the demand for some types of preferential admission 
programs. Even the petitioner estimates that "minority 
conscious programs" will be necessary for some 25 to 50 
years. Br. for Petr, p. 43, n. 53. It seems to me, 
therefore, that the relevant prudential considerations 
weigh heavily in favor of our resolving the constitutional 
issue that is before us, which was the issue that 
prompted us to take the case. 
II 
7. 
The remaining argument is that if the Court were 
to affirm the judgment of the California Supreme Court, any 
indication in the Court's opinion that race properly may be 
one element to be weighed in admission decisions would be 
mere dictum and therefore inappropriate. Again, I 
respectfully differ from those who hold this view. 
We are not reviewing the judgment below in a 
vacuum. It draws meaning from the opinion supporting it, 
and that meaning is that race may never be considered to 
any extent in admitting students to a university. 
Certainly the opinion of the California court has been read 
that way, and I do not see how it can be read any other 
way. For the reasons stated in my November 22 memorandum 
to the Conference, I think this holding is erroneous. If a 
~ 
majority of this Court were to agree with me, we would be 






It would not suffice for us merely to state that 
we do not read the California judgment as necessarily 
prohibiting all use of race in admissions decisions, or to 
say that we reserve judgment on other types of race 
conscious plans. In view of the opinion below (which, 
incidentally, did identify a number of non-racial factors 
that could be considered), such an unenlightening statement 
by this Court would merely perpetuate the confusion and 
doubt that now exists. 
It must be remembered that petitioner argues that 
educational diversity is a compelling state interest, and 
-=-7 --------------- --------
further argues - as do many of the amici briefs - that this 
interes t cannot be served effectively by a ny means other 
than a dual track system. As stated in my November 22 
memo, I agree that diversity of the student body, as that 
term is now used, is now generally ~ecognizEd as a state 
and educational interes t of the highest importance. But I 
do not agree with petitioner's argument that the only 
efficacious means of serving this interest is a Davis-type 
program. Accordingly, it would be essential to demonstrate 
that other less restrictive means not only are available, 
but are employed successfully by leading universities. I 
can think of no better way to demonstrate that less 
restrictive alternatives do exist than to reply on the 
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In sum, I think that prudential considerations -
the desirability of resolving a constitutional issue of 
national importance and one that will not "go away" - weigh 
strongly in favor of stayiP1 on the course that we charted 
when we granted certiorari. I hold this view quite without 
regard to whether the California judgment is affirmed, 
affirmed in part and reversed in part (to the extent of 
modifying the order), or reversed. And, in view of my 
perception as to the correct analysis of the constitutional 
issue, I consider it both necessary to a reasoned opinion, 
as well as prudential, to negate petitioner's basic 
position by demonstrating that valid and less restrictive 
and means are available to further the asserted sta te 
interest. 
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May 1, 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-811 - Regents of the Univers i ty of 
California v. Bakke 
The Chief, not inappropriately, has been pressing me 
for a vote in this case. 
Since my two months I relegation to the sidelines - - from 
November 11 to early January - - although constantly stewing about 
the Bakke case, I purposefully and I think properly, gave priority 
to the attempt to stay even with all the other work. I feel that I have 
been successful in this and that, except for Bakke, I have held nothing 
up either for a dissent or for any other reason. 
Absorbing Bakke was not made easier by the voluminous and 
eager writings. I have read each and all of these word by word, as well 
as the many briefs, for I have felt obliged to review what has proved 
to be so oppositely persuasive for members of the Court. Having done 
all this, and having given the 1natter earnest and, as some of my 








1. At least until the early 1970's, only a very small per-
centage, perhaps less than 2%, of all physicians and attorneys and 
medical students and law students in the United States were members 
of what we have come to think of as minority groups. In addition, 
three-fourths of our black physicians were t rained at two medical 
schools. If ways are not found to remedy this situation, the Country 
can never achieve its professed goal of a society that is not race 
conscious. 
2. I yield to no one in my earnest hope that the time soon 
will come when an "affirmative action" program is unnecessary and 
only a relic of the past. I would hope that we could reach this stage 
within a decade, but history strongly ·suggests that that hope is a 
forlorn one. Even the University here anticipates a longer period. 
At some time, however, we must reach a stage of maturity, beyond 
any transitional inequality, where action along this line is no longer 
necessary. Then persons may be regarded as persons, and past dis-
crimination will be an ugly feature of history that has been overcome. 
3. This is not an ideal world. It probably never will be. It 
is easy to give legislative language a literal construction when one 
assumes that the factual atmosphere is idealistic. But we live 1n a 
real world. 
- - 3 -
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4. There is as yet no absolute right to higher education in 
the United States. 
5. The number of qualified, indeed highly qualified, appli-
cants for places in existing medical schools in the United States 
far exceeds the number of places available. Thus, wholly apart 
from racial and ethnic considerations, the selection process in-
evitably results in the denial of admission to many qualified appli-
cants, indeed, to more qualified a pplicants than to those w ho are 
granted admission. This, of course, is a denial to the deserving. 
6. We see this very same thing, on a smaller and more 
intim ate scale, wh e n those of us who personally choose our law 
clerks are confronted annually with a surplus of well-trained, high-
ly qualified young m en a n d w omen, all of whom could do the work 
expected of a clerk, and do it acc e ptably. Yet we m ust, and do, 
make the selection and thereby d e ny to many w hat they earnestly 
desire to have. That se l e ction proces s p e rhaps affects the appli-
cants' professional careers one way or the other, for better or for 
w orse. I doubt that the crisis of clerk s e l e ction is very differe nt 
from the crisis of graduate school adm ission, except that it co1nes-





7. All this, in my view, makes the issues involved in the 
Bakke case both vital and unusually difficult. The issues are made 
seemingly more difficult when Bakke, an excluded person not charged 
with discrimination, is the one who is disadvantaged, and when the 
University itself is not charged with past discrimination. 
8. One theoretical solution, of course, to the need for more 
minority members in higher education would be to enlarge the number 
of places in the graduate schools. Then all who desired and were 
qualified could enter, and talk of discrimination would vanish. Un-
fortunately, this is not feasible or realistic. The vast resources that 
w ould be required apparently are n ot a vailable, and perhaps the need 
for just more professional g-raduates, in the strict numerical sense, 
has not at all been demonstrated. 
9. There is no particular significance in the 84-16 division 
at Davis. The same considerations necessarily apply if the Special 
Program were to focus on only 12 or 8 or 4 places or, indeed, on 
but 1. 
10. It is somewhat ironic to have us so convulsed and 
deeply_ disturbed o ver a program where -r a--c e is an element oL __ 
consciousness,- and yet to be a w are of the fact that institutions of 





to a point to the skilled athlete, to the children of alumni, to the 
affluent who may bestow their largess on the institution, and to those 
having connections with celebrities and the famous. No one seems 
to have evinced much concern about such practices. There are 
grumblings here and there, but no action. 
11. Programs of admission to institutions of higher learning 
are basically a responsibility for academicians and for administrators 
and the specialists they employ. The Judiciary, in contrast, is ill 
equipped and poorly trained for this. As the Chief said in his typed 
circulation, the Court consistently has acknowledged that the admini-
stration and management of educational institutions is beyond the 
competence of judges and is within the special competence of edu-
cators, provided always that the latter perform within legal and 
constitutional bounds. Lewis I references to comments by Felix 
Frankfurter and Bill Brennan are in the same vein. For me, inter-
ference by the Judiciary must be the rare e x ception and not the rule. 
12. An admissions policy that has an awareness of race as 
an element seems to me to be the only -possible and -realistic means 
of achieving the societal goal I have mentioned above. The question, 






13. Our individual answers to the issues here will depend, 
I suspect, in large part upon our respective personal conceptions 
of the kind of America that was contemplated by Title VI and by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Title VI 
1. I agree that we must confront this issue and decide it, 
and that we cannot, or at least should not, sidestep it. If it proves 
to be dispositive, that is an end to the matter. 
2. I do not read the legislative remarks the way the Chief 
Justice does. In particular, I do not read Senator Humphrey's re-
marks that way. Hubert, I believe, was merely expressing again 
his American dream and saying, in a different and, of course, better 
way, what I have tried to say above about a mature society that looks 
upon each other as just Americans and not as ethnic or minority 
groups. Hubert's emphasis was inclusive, not exclusive. I suspect, 
from what I know of the S e nator, there could be only one answer for 
him to the Bakk~ case;- indeed, I doubt if he -would--find it very difficult 
at all. I suspect much the same could be said of Judge~Robinson. 
3. The administrative regulat-ion-s, as they- read-today-, 







4. I feel that Congress, in Title VI, as with the Amend-
ment, was concerned with the unconstitutional use of race criteria, 
not with the use of race as an appropriate remedial feature. 
5. I tentatively agree with Lewis that a decision on Title VI 
alone is not the way to go in this case. For me, it is hard to conclude 
that Title VI reads more extensively than the Fourteenth Amendment. 
6. On balance, and although the is sue is not an easy one, 
I would probably conclude that there is no independent cause of action 
under Title VI. ' 
7. Nevertheless, along with Byron, I am willing to assume 
that a private cause of action exists under Title VI and to go on from 
there. The assumption, for what it is worth, avoids, as Lewis points 
out, the sticky questions (a) whether there is an implied right of action 
under Title VI, (b) whether such entails private remedies, and (c) 
whether there was any administrative remedy yet to be exhausted. 
8. Once that assun1ption is m a de, it seems to me that the 
issue under Title VI generally coalesces with the issue under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
9. The particular form of that P<l:!t of the decree entered by 
the Superior Court, and allowed to remain by the Supreme Court of 






question . I think a decision is compelled. I therefore agree with 
Byron and Bill Brennan that the Court should decide whether race can 
ever be a permissible consideration . 
The Fourteenth Amendment and Equal Protection 
1. I can accept the propositions that (a) Fourteenth Amend -
ment rights are personal , (b) racial and ethnic distinctions where 
they are stereotypes are inherently suspect and call for exacting 
judicial scrutiny, (c) academic freedom is a special concern of .the 
First Amendment, and {d) the Fourteenth Amendment has expanded 
beyond its confines of 1868 and now, as Lewis states, has reached 
the point where it espouses "a broader principle . 11 
2. This e x pantion of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, 
does not mean, for me, that it has broken away from its original 
intended purposes. Those original aims persist. And that, in a 
distinct sense , is what affirmative action, in the light of proper 
facts, is all about . To be s ure, it con flicts with idealistic equality 
in the sens~ that Bill R ehnquist proposes, but if there is tension. 
here it is original Fourteenth Amendm ent tension and part of the 
Amen dment 1 s very nature until equ ality is achieved. In t b i13 _§err_se_, __ _ 
equal protection may be used as a shield. 
J 
:,. 
- - 9 -3. The very raison d'etre of the Fourteenth Amendment 
may not be set aside entirely or ignored for a "new era" when we 
are dealing with the kind of disadv antage bred by the discrimination 
of our own past, the "unrequited toil," to use Lincoln's words, the 
Equal Protection Clause was designed to counter. To do otherwise 
is to ignore history. 
4 . As Byron says, although speaking directly of Title VI, 
the unconstitutional use of race that is prohibited, not the ~--~ 
~ 
~..--/ constitutional use. 
f ~~ }ZJ-- 5. The decided 
' 
cases may not be set aside. They are, of 
-
course, n ot precisely on point, but neither are they off point. Racial 
factors have been given consideration in the school desegregation 
cases, in the employment cases, in Lau v. Nichols, and in United 
Jewish Organizations. True, som e of the se m ay be distinguished on 
the ground that victimi zation was directly present. But who is to say 
tha t victimization here is n ot pre sent alth ough, of course, it is of a 
lesser and different degree. We all rem ember how the disadvantaged 
group in Unitea Jewish Organiz ations complained at what was being 
done-; A n d surely in Lau v. Nichols ~ e looke d to ethnicity. _ In addi-
tion, . there is the growing body of c a ses among the lower courts 





achieved that would have prevailed had past discrimination n<;t taken 
place. I have in mind specifically the Minneapolis employment-of-
firemen case in which, I believe, we denied certiorari a few years 
ago. 
6. I doubt that the sex classification cases are so easily 
brushed aside just because they are 11 relatively manageable 11 and less 
complex. 
7. The weakness, of course, in the specific Davis program 
is its susceptibility to labeling as a blatant quota system, which Lewis 
so effectively attacks. Lewis would uphold the Harvard-Columbia-
Pennsylvania-Stanford program where race or ethnic background is 
put forward as only one of many factors and where good faith in its 
administration is professed. I, too, am willing to accept that element 
of good faith, if for no other reason, I suppose, than that I saw it in 
operation when I worked a little in past years on admissions in the 
field. Nevertheless, the line between the Harvard program and the 
Davis progr':m is a thin one. - In each, subjective application is at 
work. At worst, one could say that under the Harvard program one 
rna.y accomplish covertly what D a vis <t oes openly.-- I must agree with 
Lewis that Harvard 1 s middle-road program seems to be much the -_ 







is within constitutional bounds, though perhaps barely so. It is 
free of stigma. I am not willing to infer a constitutional violation. 
We did not do s o in United Jewish Organizations and I would not do 
so here. 
8. For what it is worth, governmental preference has not 
been a stranger to our legal life. We see it in veterans 1 preferences. 
We see it in the aid-to-the-handicapped programs . We see it in the 
progressive income tax. We see it in the Indian programs . We may 
excuse some oLthese on the ground that they have specific constitu-
tional protection and, as with the case of Indians, that they are govern-
mental wards. Nevertheless, these preferences may not be ignored. 
And in the admissions field, as I have indicated above, educational 
institutions have always used geography, athletic ability, anticipated 
financial largess, alumni preference, and many other factors. 
9. The Davis program is a benign one and carries no stigma . 
Its race-conscious aspect could be far better formulated, but the 
numbers it employs are reasonably acceptable to the necessary social 
goal. Its very race-consciousness has no invidious purpose and meets 
Fourteenth Amendment requirements . 
10.- Alex Bickel 1 s elegant· and shining words, of course, speak 
of the idealistic and have great appeal. But I say, once more, that 





and I hope I offend no one, for I do not mean to do so -- the 11 accepted 11 
Jewish approach. It is to be noted that nearly all the responsible 
Jewish organizations who have filed amicus briefs here are one side 
of the case. They understandably want "pure" equality and are willing 
to take their chances with it, knowing that they have the inherent 
ability to excel and to live with it successfully. Centuries of perse-
cution and adversity and discrimination have given the Jewish people 
this great attribute to compete successfully and this remarkable 
fortitude. 
11. We all are aware, of course, of Bill Douglas' writing 
and dissent in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S., at 320. At the same 
time, we all remember Bill's hesitance and voting vacillation in that 
case. 
12. There is much to be said for Thurgood's "cruelest irony" 
approach as set forth in his memorandum of April 13. 
Summary 
In g~neral, then, my position, as of now, -is to embark upon ~--
at least a cursory examination of Title VI, with a statement of general 
pr_inciples as to statutory a n d constitutional solutions; to express doubt 
about the existence of a private right of action under Title VI; -to assume, 






under Title V I with those under the Fourteenth Amendment; and to 
hold that the Davis program, despite its superficial vestments, 
comports with the Fourteenth Amendment. I therefore vote to 
reverse. 
I have not had the benefit of the Conference discussion of 
early December, so I do not know precisely how my vote affects the 
ultimate tally. All I know is what I read and infer from the several 
writings. 
I appreciate the patience of each and all of you; For me, 
this case is of such importance that I refused to be drawn to a 
precipitate conclusion. I wanted the time to think about it and to 
study the pertinent material. Because weeks are still available 





JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.inprtmt QJo-urt of tqt 'J!lttfuh ~tatts 
'Dlasfrington. ~ . QJ. 21l,?'1-,;l 
April 13, 1978 
Re: No. 76-811, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
I repeat, for next to the last time: the decision in 
this case depends on whether you consider the action of the 
Regents as admitting certain students or as excluding 
certain other students. If you view the program as 
admitting qualified students who, because of this Nation's 
sorry history of racial discrimination, have academic 
records that prevent them from effectively competing for 
medical school, then this is affirmative action to remove 
the vestiges of slavery and state imposed segregation by 
"root and branch." If you view the program as excluding 
students, it is a program of "quotas" which violates the 
principle that the "Constitution is color-blind." 
If only the principle of color-blindne ss had been 
accepted by the majority in Plessy in 1896, we would not be 
faced with this problem in 1978. We must remember, 
however, that this principle appeared only in the dissent. 
In the 60 years from Plessy to Brown, ours was a Nation 
where, by law, individuals could be given "special" 





principle of color-blindness prevents the University from 
giving "special" consideration to race when this Court, in 
1896 licensed the states to continue to consider race, is 
to make a mockery of the principle of "equal justice under 
law." 
As a result of our last discussion on this case, I wish 
also to address the question of whether Negroes have 
"arrived." Just a few examples illustrate that Negroes 
most certainly have not. In our own Court, we have had 
only three Negro law clerks, and not so far have we had a 
Negro Officer of the Court. On a broader scale, this 
week's U.S. News and World Report has a story about "Who 
Runs America." They list some 83 persons -- not one Negro, 
even as a would-be runnerup. And the economic disparity 
between the races is increasing. According to the latest 
report of the United States Commission on Civil Rights: 
"While the average jobless rate for whites fell 
from 7 percent in 1976 to 6.2 percent in 1977, the 
average unemployment rate for blacks increased from 
13.8 percent to 13.9 percent during that period. The 
black unemployment rate thus was more than twice as 
great as that for whites during 1977. For workers of 
Hispanic origin, the average jobless rate dropped from 
11.5 percent in 1976 to 10 percent in 1977 but 
unemployment among Hispanic was still 1. 6 times higher 
than that among whites." 
The dream of America as the melting pot has not been 
realized by Negroes -- either the Negro did not get into 
the pot, or he did not get melted down. The statistics on 




of the Solicitor General and other amici document the vast 
gulf between White and Black America. That gulf was 
brought about by centuries of slavery and then by another 
century in which, with the approval of this Court, states 
were permitted to treat Negroes "specially." 
This case is here now because of that sordid history. 
So despite the lousy record, the poorly reasoned lower 
court opinion, and the absence as parties of those who will 
be most affected by the decision (the Negro applicants), we 
are stuck with this case. We are not yet all equals, in 
large part because of the refusal of the Plessy Court to 
adopt the principle of color-blindness. It would be the 
cruelest irony for this Court to adopt the dissent in 
Plessy now and hold that the University must use 
color-blind admissions. 
Sincerely., 
ftiA- . 
. . 
T.M. 
